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THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM
Richard Briffault*
Recent campaign finance innovations of the major political parties
have blown large and widening holes in federal campaign finance regula-
tion. The relationship between parties and candidates also challenges the
basic doctrinal categories of campaign finance law. The Constitution per-
mits regulation of campaign finances to deal with the danger of corruption.
But some judges and commentators have argued that the parties present no
danger of corruption. This Article finds that, although parties play a posi-
tive role in funding campaigns, certain party practices raise the specter of
corruption in the constitutional sense. Moreover, due to the close connection
between parties and candidates, and the parties' role in linking private do-
nors to key participants in the legislative process, party campaign practices
may, constitutionally, be subject to greater regulation than comparable prac-
tices of nonparty political organizations. The Article presents specific propos-
als for dealing with the party activities that have undermined campaign
finance law, and argues that such reforms would also bolster the positive role
the parties play in the political process.
INTRODUCTION
The major political parties present a central, and particularly net-
tlesome, difficulty for federal campaign finance regulation. In the last
decade, party campaign finance practices have blown large, and widen-
ing, holes in the campaign finance system that Congress created with the
Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA"),1 and that the Supreme Court
modified and sustained in Buckley v. Valeo. 2 Through the development of
soft money,3 the parties have enabled donors to avoid FECA's contribu-
tion caps, its ban on the use of corporate and union treasury funds in
federal elections, and its limitation on spending by presidential candi-
dates who choose to accept public funding. By exploiting so-called "issue
advocacy" advertising,4 the parties have successfully channeled millions of
dollars otherwise prohibited by FECA into the heart of federal election
campaigns. The Supreme Court's 1996 determination that parties may
* Vice-Dean and Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia
University School of Law.
1. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1994 & Supp. IV
1998) (amended 1974). The laws providing for the public funding of presidential
candidates are technically distinct from FECA. See Presidential Campaign Fund Act, 26
U.S.C. §§ 9001-9012 (1994), Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act, 26
U.S.C. §§ 9031-9042 (1994). I will, however, be referring to FECA as a shorthand for the
federal campaign finance laws generally, including the presidential public funding laws.
2. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
3. Soft money is explained more fully in the text accompanying infra notes 33-45.
4. The concept of issue advocacy is explained in text accompanying infra notes
436-559.
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engage in independent spending in support of party candidates 5 has pro-
vided the parties with yet another opening to evade the basic structure of
FECA, although the greater opportunities offered by the combination of
soft money and issue advocacy have, for the moment at least, muted the
role of party independent spending.
These party finance techniques are not simply instances of clever ad-
aptation to the FECA-Buckley regime, although the gaming of the system
by donors and politicians and the failure of Congress over the last quarter
century to respond to campaign finance innovations are part of the story.
Rather, these party practices grow out of fault lines central to the consti-
tutional law of campaign finance. As a result, closing the loopholes ex-
ploited by the parties presents difficult constitutional questions. Never-
theless, as I will indicate in this Article, new rules that would curb the
party activities that are eroding the campaign finance laws can be
adopted consistent with the principles enunciated in Buckley. Indeed,
such laws are essential to address a fundamental concern of the FECA-
Buckley regime-the prevention of the undue influence of private wealth,
and the appearance of such influence, on government decisionmaking.
This Article considers the place of the major political parties in our
campaign finance system-the role the parties currently play, the consti-
tutional doctrines that must be considered in regulating the parties, the
reasons for regulating party activities currently beyond the scope of
FECA, and some legislative proposals for bringing party campaign fi-
nance practices into closer compliance with the values that inform our
campaign finance laws.6
Part I takes stock of the FECA regime as it has evolved in the last two
decades. In particular, it analyzes how FECA affects the parties, and how,
in turn, the major party campaign finance innovations have emerged
outside of FECA to the point that they are now eroding the efficacy of
federal campaign finance law.
5. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604-13 (1996)
(plurality opinion).
6. This Article focuses solely on the campaign finance practices of the major political
parties and on the constitutional issues posed by efforts to regulate the activities of these
parties. Two major parties, the Democratic and Republican parties, have held the
Presidency and the overwhelming majority of seats of both houses of Congress throughout
the twentieth century. As a result, these parties-and any other parties that become
"major" in the future-are and ought to be the central focus of the application of
campaign finance law to the parties. Cf. 26 U.S.C. § 9002 (6), (7), (8) (distinguishing,
based on percentage of the popular vote received in the last presidential election, among
"major," "minor," and "new" parties, for purposes of the presidential public funding
system). Minor parties may pose policy and constitutional issues different than those
affecting the major parties, cf. Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S.
87 (1982) (holding unconstitutional the application of FECA's disclosure requirements to
a minor party that had been the subject of government harassment), and are beyond the
scope of this article. Even when the text does not refer to "major" parties specifically, the
major parties are its intended focus.
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Part II considers the constitutional questions that would be raised by
efforts to regulate these party campaign finance practices. The constitu-
tional law of campaign finance is framed by Buckley v Valeo, but the major
political parties present special problems for the application of the Buck-
ley doctrine. First, Buckley assumes a sharp separation between candidates,
on the one hand, and politically active organizations, such as political
action committees ("PACs") that participate in the electoral process, on
the other. Buckley permits greater regulation of such organizations when
an organization works with a candidate-such as by giving the candidate
a contribution or coordinating its spending with a candidate-than when
the organization operates independently. The major parties, however,
nominate candidates, are composed of candidates, and are primarily fo-
cused on the election of candidates. The close structural connection be-
tween the major parties and their candidates blurs the line that Buckley
posits between candidates and political organizations and complicates
Buckley's efforts to distinguish between activity coordinated with and that
independent of a candidate.
Similarly, Buckley differentiates between an organization's financial
support for activity involving the discussion of political issues and its fi-
nancial support of efforts to elect candidates, and permits regulation of
only candidate-election-related activities. Again, this assumes that organi-
zations that participate in politics have goals other than the election of
candidates. But the overarching concern of the major parties is with win-
ning elections. As a result, the Court's distinction between "issue advo-
cacy" and the "express advocacy" of the election of candidates is particu-
larly problematic when applied to party spending.
Finally, Buckley provides that the only basis for limiting campaign fi-
nance activities is to prevent "corruption"-broadly defined to include
improper influence and opportunities for abuse, as well as quid pro quo
arrangements-and the appearance of corruption. 7 But many political
scientists and several members of the Supreme Court have argued that
party campaign finance activities raise little danger of corruption. In
their view, the very closeness of the party-candidate relationship, which
undermines the applicability of the PAC model and PAC-based views of
independent spending and issue advocacy in the party context, also elimi-
nates the issue of corruption. If parties and candidates are so intertwined
and have such common interests that the former cannot corrupt the lat-
ter, then all present and proposed rules limiting party money rest on
shaky constitutional foundation.
I argue that the close relationship between parties and candidates
renders the PAC model of the candidate-organization relationship and of
political organization's electoral speech inapposite to parties. The doctri-
nal distinctions Buckley draws can and should be interpreted differently in
7. 424 U.S. 1, at 28. See also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 120 S.Ct. 897, 905
(2000).
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the party context, in light of the party-candidate relationship, so as to
define more party activities as coordinated with candidates and to treat
more party expenditures as election-related. I will also argue that the
closeness of the party-candidate relationship does not eliminate the ques-
tion of corruption. Rather, once the connections linking parties, donors
to parties, and candidates are examined, it is clear that unlimited dona-
tions to and spending by the parties raise issues of "corruption" within
Buckley's meaning.
Part III presents and defends proposals for dealing with the three
principal party threats to the campaign finance system that have emerged
in the last decade: party independent expenditures, soft money, and
party issue advocacy. 8 These proposals would narrow the definitions of
independent expenditures and issue advocacy in the party context, while
subjecting all donations to party activities concerning federal elections to
FECA's restrictions. By so doing, they seek to harmonize the rights of
parties to engage in constitutionally protected political activity, and the
benefits of party participation in federal elections, with the goal of restor-
ing the integrity of the campaign finance system. These proposals should
not be seen as anti-party. The parties play a positive role in our political
system. Indeed, I will suggest that once party money is brought back
under FECA, increasing the amount of money the parties are allowed to
spend in support of their candidates would actually be desirable. But un-
limited contributions to, and unlimited spending by, the parties jeopar-
dizes the anti-corruption values at the heart of campaign finance law.
Unless party money is subject to effective limits, campaign finance reform
is doomed to failure.
8. As this Article was going to press, a fourth and potentially very significant new party
threat to the campaign finance system emerged. On May 5, 2000, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit invalidated FECA's limits on party expenditures that are
coordinated with a party's congressional candidate. See Colorado Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm. v. FEC ("Colorado Republican II"), No. 99-1211, 2000 WL 554688 (10th
Cir. May 5, 2000). If it stands, Colorado Republican II would render irrelevant the distinction
between party-coordinated expenditures and independent expenditures drawn by the
Supreme Court in Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604
(1996). Parties would be able to spend unlimited amounts of hard money in support of
their candidates or against candidates of the opposing party. However, the distinctions
between hard and soft money, and between party express advocacy and party issue
advocacy, would remain significant. A full evaluation of Colorado Republican II is beyond
the scope of this Article, but a brief critical assessment of the decision and its implications
for reform of the rules governing party campaign finance practices is provided at infra
notes 174-190 and accompanying text.
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 100:620
I. PARTY MONEY UNDER, AND OUTSIDE OF, FECA
A. FECA and the Parties9
FECA limits donations to parties by individuals and political action
committees ("PACs"). It provides that a person10 may contribute up to
$20,000 per calendar year to the national committees of a political party,
and up to $5000 per calendar year to a state party committee for activities
in connection with federal elections.1 A PAC can contribute up to
$15,000 per calendar year to the national committees of a party, and up
to $5000 per calendar year to a state party committee for federal election
activity.' 2 Corporations and labor unions are prohibited from making
any contributions to party activities in support of federal candidates, but
they may sponsor PACs that can give to party committees, subject to the
dollar limits applicable to PAC contributions. 13 In this way, FECA's limits
on donations to parties generally track the Act's limits on donations to
PACs, except that the limits on donations to parties are higher than the
limits on donations to other political committees. 14
9. In the text, I discuss FECA's limits on contributions to parties, and on party support
of candidates. The Act also imposes reporting and disclosure requirements on the parties,
see 2 U.S.C. § 434(a) (4), (b) (1994), and makes the parties whose presidential candidates
qualify for public funding eligible for funds to defray the costs of their presidential
nominating conventions, see 26 U.S.C. § 9008 (1994). Some commentators have found
that the reporting requirements have had a real impact on party participation in federal
elections. They have suggested that FECA's rules contributed to the centralization of party
activity from the local to the state level and, at least until the parties became more familiar
with FECA, tended to discourage state party involvement in federal races. See, e.g., Paul S.
Herrnson, Party Campaigning in the 1980s 28-29 (1988) [hereinafter Herrnson, Party
Campaigning in the 1980s]; Xandra Kayden, The Nationalizing of the Party System in
Parties, Interest Groups, and Campaign Finance Laws 257, 262-65 (MichaelJ. Malbin ed.,
1980).
10. Under FECA, "person" includes "an individual, partnership, committee,
association, corporation, labor organization, or any other organization or group of
persons" other than the federal government. 2 U.S.C. § 431(11) (1994). FECA imposes
additional restrictions on national banks, corporations, and unions. See id. § 441b.
11. See id. § 441a(a) (1) (B), (C). The limit on contributions to a state party
committee also includes contributions to any local party committee within that state.
12. See id. § 441a(a) (2) (B), (C). A PAC may not contribute more than $5000 per
election to a federal candidate, nor more than $5000 per calendar year to another PAC.
See id. § 441a(a) (2) (A), (C). There is no annual limit on aggregate PAC contributions to
candidates, party committees, and other PACs.
13. See id. § 441b(a). FECA does not specifically prohibit corporation and union
contributions to parties: Rather, the Act generally bans corporate and union
contributions and expenditures in connection with federal election activities.
Contributions to parties fall within the general prohibition on corporate and union
financial participation in federal election campaigns.
14. The Act imposes much lower limits on individual contributions to candidates and
PACs. A person can contribute no more than $1000 per election to a federal candidate,
and no more than $5000 per calendar year to a PAC. See id. § 441a(a) (1) (A), (C). Total
election-related contributions by an individual to candidates, PACs, and party committees
may not exceed $25,000 in any calendar year. See id. § 441a(a) (3).
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The same provision of FECA that limits PAC contributions also lim-
its party contributions to candidates, although once again FECA treats
parties more generously than it treats PACs. Thus, like PACs, party com-
mittees-including the national committee, the Senate campaign com-
mittee, the House campaign committee, and the state party committee-
may each donate up to $5000 to a federal candidate per election. 15
FECA, however, offers the parties two special campaign finance op-
portunities that are unavailable to PACs. First, the parties may engage in
"coordinated expenditures." In general, FECA treats all money spent by
an individual or organization in coordination with a candidate as though
it were a direct contribution to that candidate, subject to the Act's contri-
bution ceiling.' 6 However, FECA authorizes party committees-and only
party committees-to engage in coordinated expenditures with candi-
dates that do not count against the contribution caps.1 7 These party-co-
ordinated expenditures are subject to dollar limits,' 8 but the limits are
much higher than the Act's limits on contributions and, unlike the caps
on contributions, they are adjusted for inflation.1 9 In addition, a state
15. See id. FECA has a special rule that permits a party national committee, its Senate
campaign committee, or the two together to contribute $17,500 to a Senate candidate per
campaign, e.g., primary and general election together. See id. § 441a(h). FECA generally
treats primary, runoff, and general elections as different elections. See id. § 431(1)(A).
Thus, in a typical election cycle in which a candidate contests both a primary and a general
election, the limit on PAC and party committee donations to a candidate is $10,000.
Similarly, the $1000 cap on individual donations to a candidate is $2000 per election cycle.
As a rule, parties do not contribute to candidates in contested primaries. See Paul S.
Herrnson, National Party Organizations at the Century's End, in The Parties Respond:
Changes in American Parties and Campaigns 50, 65 (L. Sandy Maisel ed., 3d ed. 1998)
[hereinafter Herrnson, National Party Organizations].
16. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (7) (B) (i).
17. See id. § 441a(d).
18. As this article was going to press, a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit invalidated FECA's caps on party-coordinated expenditures. See supra
note 8 and infra notes 174-190 and accompanying text.
19. The limits for Senate and presidential races are also based on voting age
population ("VAP"). A party national committee may spend two cents per VAP, inflation-
adjusted from a 1974 base, in support of the party's presidential ticket. See id.
§ 441a(d)(2). Under this formula, each of the two major national parties will be able to
spend $13.3 million in coordinated spending in support of its presidential ticket in 2000.
See FEC, Press Release, If the Presidential Election Were Held in 1999 (July 7, 1999)
<http://www.fec.gov/press/spend99.htm> (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The
national and state parties may also each spend the greater of $20,000 in 1974 dollars, or
two cents in 1974 prices times state VAP in coordinated expenditures in connection with
party Senate candidates, or House of Representatives candidates in a state which has only
one House seat. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d) (3) (A). The coordinated spending limit for party
spending in support of other House candidates is $10,000, inflation-adjusted from a 1974
base. See id. § 441a(d) (3) (B). In 1998, limits on party-coordinated spending for Senate
candidates ranged from $130,200 in Alaska to $3,035,874 in California. The limit in House
races was $32,550 in most states, and $65,100 in states with only one congressional district.
See FEC, Press Release, FEC Announces 1998 Party Spending Limits: Amounts Range
from $130,200 to $3 Million (March 6, 1998) <http://www.fec.gov/press/ 441ad.htm> (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
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party committee may designate a national party committee-such as the
Senate campaign committee for Senate elections or the House campaign
committee for elections to the House of Representatives-as its "agent"
for coordinated spending.20 As the national committees are generally
more successful at fundraising than their state counterparts, such agency
agreements make it easier for the parties to engage in the maximum co-
ordinated spending permitted by law, and they effectively double the na-
tional committee's coordinated expenditure ceiling. Coordinated ex-
penditures are a far more important form of party campaign activity than
direct contributions to candidates. Whereas national Republican and
Democratic contributions to congressional candidates totaled $14.7 mil-
lion over the last three election cycles, aggregate coordinated expendi-
tures by the parties came to $129.4 million.21
The second special provision allows state party committees to under-
take, without limitation, certain "grass-roots" spending in support of fed-
eral candidates. These expenditures include payments for campaign
materials used in connection with volunteer activities on behalf of party
nominees, and for voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives. 22 Grass-
roots spending must be funded by contributions that comply with FECA's
dollar caps and source prohibitions, 23 but there is no ceiling on the
amount state parties can spend on these activities. Although nominally a
spending opportunity for state parties, the grass-roots exemptions
strongly benefit the national parties, which typically raise the funds for
grass-roots spending and then transfer them to state and local parties,
with directions concerning how they are to be used to aid federal
candidates.
The parties, particularly the national party committees, have done
well under FECA. They raise far more money than ever before, and they
are playing a growing role in the financing of federal election campaigns.
The Act's limits on donations to candidates, coupled with the sharp rise
in campaign costs, place a premium on intermediary organizations like
20. See, e.g., FrankJ. Sorauf, Inside Campaign Finance: Myths and Realities 112-20
(1992). The Supreme Court upheld the transfer of such spending authority in FEC v.
Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 31 (1981).
21. See FEC, Press Release, FEC Reports on Political Party Activity for 1997-98 (April
9, 1999) <http://www.fec.gov/press/ptyye98.htm> (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter FEC, Political Party Activity].
These figures may understate the value of coordinated expenditures. Most
coordinated expenditures consist of in-kind services: the provision of polling data, mailing
lists, assistance with fundraising, campaign management, opposition research, and
preparation and placement of advertising. These services are often obtained from
consultants who provide them to the parties, as repeat participants in the political process,
at a discount, so that their value to the candidate is likely to exceed the cost to the party.
See Anthony Gierzynski, Legislative Party Campaign Committees in the American States
53-54 (1992); Herrnson, National Party Organizations, supra note 15, at 73 (stating that
party in-kind campaign services "are worth many times more than their reported value").
22. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(8) (B) (x), (xii), § 431(9) (B) (viii), (ix).
23. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(8) (B) (x) (2), (xii)(2), § 431(9) (B) (viii) (2), (ix)(2).
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PACs and party committees that can help candidates obtain funds and
defray some of their campaign expenses. Although initially PACs were
the preeminent beneficiaries of FECA, the national parties emerged over
the course of the 1980s as important financial participants in federal elec-
tions. For the first time, the national party committees built up a mass
financial base, accumulating large aggregates of money through relatively
small donations from a large number of donors. 24 Due to their fundrais-
ing prowess, the party congressional campaign committees ("CCCs")-
which are composed of members of Congress organized by party and
chamber-have become significant players in congressional races. They
provide candidates with money, aid them in raising funds from PACs and
individual donors, and are involved in candidate recruitment, campaign
management, the production and placement of candidate ads, and the
mobilization of voters. 25
B. The Growing Role of Party Money Outside of FECA
In recent years, three new mechanisms have further expanded and
reshaped the party campaign finance role: party independent expendi-
tures, soft money, and party issue advocacy. Unlike contributions and
coordinated expenditures, however, these devices developed outside of
FECA and they now directly challenge the Act's structure of contribution
and spending restrictions.
1. Party Independent Expenditures. - Buckley v. Valeo invalidated the
FECA provision that would have capped the amount of money an individ-
ual or group could spend independently of a candidate in support of that
candidate or against her opponent. As a result, individuals and PACs may
spend unlimited amounts of money on so-called "independent expendi-
tures."26 In the first two decades following Buckley it was widely assumed
that party electoral spending was necessarily coordinated with candidates,
and, thus, that parties could not take advantage of the Supreme Court's
protection of independent expenditures.2 7 In 1996, however, a Supreme
24. See, e.g., Herrnson, National Party Organizations, supra note 15, at 59 (stating
that the national party organizations raise most of their hard money in the form of direct
mail contributions under $100); Leon Epstein, Political Parties in the American Mold
276-78 (1986) (contrasting historic dependence of the parties on a small number of very
large donors with the post-FECA development of a mass financial base).
25. The rising financial and campaign role of the CCCs under FECA is examined in
Herrnson, Party Campaigning in the 1980s, supra note 9, at 30-83 (1988) and Robin
Kolodny: Pursuing Majorities: Congressional Campaign Committees in American Politics
124-55 (1998).
26. 424 U.S. 1, 39-59 (1976).
27. See David Adamany, Political Parties in the 1980s, in Money and Politics in the
United States: Financing Elections in the 1980s 70, 72-73 (MichaelJ. Malbin ed., 1984); F.
Christopher Arterton, Political Money and Party Strength, in The Future of American
Political Parties: The Challenge of Governance 101, 116 (Joel L. Fleishman ed., 1982);
KirkJ. Nahra, Political Parties and the Campaign Finance Laws: Dilemmas, Concerns and
Opportunities, 56 Fordham L. Rev. 53, 97 (1987); see also FEC v. Democratic Senatorial
Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 28 n.1 (1981) ("Party committees are considered incapable
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Court plurality determined in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Com-
mittee v. Federal Election Commission that a party may engage in independ-
ent spending, and that such party spending is entitled to the same consti-
tutional protection from limitation that extends to independent
spending by PACs or individuals.28
Colorado Republican provided the parties with a major opportunity to
avoid FECA's limits on party spending in congressional races. In the
months immediately following the decision, the national Republican
Party put together a $10 million independent expenditure program, pri-
marily supporting the party's Senate candidates. 29 The Democrats lagged
with a more modest $1.5 million program.30 In 1998, however, the role
of party independent spending declined. The Democrats again commit-
ted $1.5 million (or about 7% of their combined total of contributions to
and spending in support of candidates) to independent expenditures,
but Republican party spending dropped to under $300,000. 3 1 The par-
ties' apparent disinterest in exploiting the opportunities for independent
spending appears to have resulted from the emergence of another, more
attractive means of providing unlimited support for party candidates: the
use of party soft money to finance so-called "issue advocacy. '32
2. Soft Money. - Party contributions to candidates, party-coordi-
nated expenditures with candidates, party grass-roots expenditures, and
even the party independent expenditures unleashed in Colorado Republi-
can all involve so-called "hard money," that is, money raised in compli-
ance with FECA's dollar limits and source prohibitions. Funding for
these activities must abide by FECA's restrictions because those activities
involve express support of the election or defeat of federal candidates
and, thus, fall within the Act's definitions of "contributions" and "expend-
itures." But, increasingly, party participation in federal elections is fi-
nanced by so-called "soft money," that is, money whose collection and
disbursement does not comply with FECA. This category includes indi-
vidual or PAC donations in excess of the Act's dollar limits, and corporate
or union donations forbidden by FECA. "Soft money" funds activities
that affect federal elections but, due to statutory definition, administra-
tive action, or judicial decision, technically fall outside FECA's scope.
Soft money emerged out of the complications of political federalism.
FECA regulates only federal elections, but federal and state elections typi-
cally occur concurrently, with candidates for federal and state offices ap-
of making 'independent' expenditures in connection with the campaigns of their party's
candidates.").
28. 518 U.S. 604, 618 (1996).
29. This compares with $34.7 million in contributions to and coordinated
expenditures with candidates in 1996. See FEC, Political Party Activity, supra note 21.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See Paul S. Herrnson & Diana Dwyre, Party Issue Advocacy in Congressional
Election Campaigns, in The State of the Parties: The Changing Role of Contemporary
American Parties 86, 90 (John C. Green & Daniel M. Shea eds., 3d ed. 1999).
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pearing on one state ballot. Party committees can and do undertake cam-
paign efforts that simultaneously assist both their federal and state
candidates. Spending on federal candidates must satisfy FECA, but aid to
state candidates is subject only to state law. Many state campaign finance
laws are less restrictive than FECA: Some permit corporations or unions
to support candidates and some do not limit individual or PAC
donations. 33
In the late 1970s, various state party committees began to press the
FEC to allow them to use funds that did not comply with FECA to par-
tially finance campaign efforts that help the party ticket as a whole, in-
cluding both federal and state candidates. In 1978 the FEC determined
that a state party could use funds impermissible under FECA to defray the
non-federal portion of administrative overhead and of the costs of some
activities, such as voter registration and voter mobilization, that directly
benefit both federal and state candidates. 34 In 1979, the FEC decided
that national party committees could also set up accounts for the deposit
and disbursement of funds otherwise barred by FECA to finance support
for the non-federal portion of the combined federal-state ticket.3 5 Soft
money was born.
Soft money grew during the 1980s, rising from $19 million in 1980 to
$45 million in 1988.36 It was used to build the infrastructure of the na-
tional parties, to hire staff, acquire office space, develop direct mail capa-
bility, run polling and issues research operations, acquire data processing
equipment, and create and improve facilities for mass media communica-
tions-all on the theory that since some portion of these activities is
aimed at state and local elections, a portion of the cost could be defrayed
by non-federal money. The national parties also transferred millions of
dollars in soft money to state parties to build their infrastructures, and
especially to fund shared voter mobilization programs such as direct mail
campaigns and phone bank operations intended to bring voters to the
polls.
In 1990, the FEC responded to years of prodding by campaign fi-
nance reformers and the courts, and issued rules, which became effective
33. In 1996, fifteen states placed no limits on individual contributions and eighteen
states placed no limits on PAC contributions. Some states with contribution ceilings use
higher limits than FECA. Eight states had no limits on corporate contributions and twelve
states had no limits on union contributions. See MichaelJ. Malbin & Thomas L. Gais, The
Day After Reform: Sobering Campaign Finance Lessons from the American States 16-17
(1999).
34. See FEC Advisory Op. 1978-10 (1978). Earlier FEC rulings had provided that only
hard money could be used to cover the costs of state party voter registration and get-out-
the-vote drives intended to benefit both state and federal candidates. See FEC Advisory
Op. 1976-72 (1976); FEC Advisory Op. 1976-83 (1976).
35. See FEC Advisory Op. 1979-17 (1979).
36. Prior to 1990, the FEC did not require the parties to report on their soft money
accounts, so the numbers in text are only estimates. See Herbert E. Alexander & Monica
Bauer, Financing the 1988 Election 37 (1991).
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in 1991, requiring party committees to report their soft money receipts,
expenditures, and transfers, and regulating the allocation of expenses for
shared activities between federal and non-federal accounts.3 7 The rules
limited the ability of party committees to shelter some funds for shared
expenses in non-federal accounts, but "[t]he general effect of the guide-
lines was ... to give party organizations a clearer sense of how to spend
soft money legally, and, at least in some instances, to permit them ... to
pay a greater share of their costs with soft money than they had been
before." 38
Soft money exploded in the 1990s. In 1991-92, the two national par-
ties raised $86 million in soft money, or double the amount for
1987-88.39 Soft money accounted for approximately 17% of total na-
tional party receipts in the 1992 election cycle. 40 By 1995-96, national
party soft money receipts had tripled to $263.5 million, and accounted
for 30% of total national party income. 41 In 1997-98, the soft money
share of national party income rose to 33% although actual party soft
money receipts declined to $224.4 million with the cyclical drop in fun-
draising tied to the transition from a presidential to a non-presidential
election. 42 National party soft money receipts during this period, how-
ever, were nearly five times the $45 million in 1988 and more than triple
the 10% soft money share of party receipts in 1993-94, the prior non-
presidential election year.43 The 1997-98 election also marked the first
time in which soft money played a critical role in congressional elections;
in previous years, the primary use of soft money had been to enable presi-
dential candidates participating in the public funding system to evade the
spending limits that are a condition for the provision of public funds.
Preliminary figures for the 1999-2000 election cycle indicate the dollar
volume of soft money is continuing to grow.44
37. See 11 C.F.R. § 106.5 (1999).
38. Anthony Corrado, Party Soft Money, in Campaign Finance Reform: A
Sourcebook 167, 175 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 1997). Even the FEC has
acknowledged that "there are.., indications that the allocation rules themselves may have
increased the amount of soft money raised by the national party committees." Prohibited
and Excessive Contributions; "Soft Money," 63 Fed. Reg. 37722, 37724 (1998) (proposed
July 13, 1998).
39. See FEC, Press Release, Political Party Fundraising Continues to Climb (Jan. 26,
1999) (visited on Mar. 2, 2000) <http://www.fec.gov/press/pty3098.htm> (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter FEC, Political Party Fundraising Continues to Climb].
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See FEC, Political Party Activity, supra note 21.
43. See id. for the data on party hard money receipts in 1993-94. The data on soft
money for that year is from Public Disclosure, Inc., Soft Money Summary (Dec. 28, 1998)
(visited on Apr. 4, 2000) <http://www.tray.com/fecinfo/-smrpt.htm> (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Public Disclosure, Inc.].
44. See FEC, Press Release, FEC Releases Fundraising Figures of Major Political
Parties-Large Gain in "Soft Money" Contributions (Sept. 22, 1999) <http:www.fec.gov/
press/pytmy99.htm> (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating that Republicans and
Democrats respectively raised 42% and 93% more in soft money during the first six
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The growth in soft money and its expansion into congressional races
reflects two developments. First, there is now a substantial number of
donors who provide very large soft money contributions. In 1997-98,
there were 390 individuals or organizations-including business corpora-
tions, labor unions, Indian tribes, and ideological groups-that gave
$100,000 or more to the soft money accounts of the national political
parties. This number of $100,000+ donors reflected a 113% increase
from 1993-94, the prior nonpresidential election cycle. Twenty-six do-
nors gave $500,000 or more; the top four donors gave more than $1 mil-
lion each. Corporate contributions, which are prohibited by FECA, dom-
inated the soft money growth, with 218 corporations giving more than
$100,000 in 1997-98, and sixteen corporations giving more than
$500,000 in that period. In the prior nonpresidential election cycle, only
96 corporations broke the $100,000 mark, and only four gave more than
$250,000. Thirty-five trade associations also gave $100,000 or more in soft
money in 1997-98. Wealthy individuals or couples provided most of the
other large soft money donations, with 114 individuals or husband-and-
wife pairs giving $100,000 or more, 26 individuals or couples giving
$250,000 or more, and four giving $500,000 or more.45
Second, the parties have discovered a major new use for soft money.
Instead of being limited, as it was in the 1980s and early 1990s, to paying
for party overhead, infrastructure improvements, and other indirect sup-
port for candidates; soft money is increasingly used to pay for election-
eering communications that directly support or attack clearly identified
federal candidates. With soft money now used to pay for issue advocacy,
the appeal of soft money has grown dramatically. So, too, has the signifi-
cance of issue advocacy.
3. Issue Advocacy. - The concept of "issue advocacy" grew out of the
Supreme Court's effort in Buckley to prevent FECA from unconstitution-
ally curtailing the discussion of political ideas and issues. The Court con-
strued FECA to apply only to "expenditures for communications that in
express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified candi-
date."46 Such expenditures are known in campaign finance jargon as "ex-
press advocacy;" all other political communications are called "issue advo-
cacy," although many so-called "issue ads" do not discuss issues at all. 47
Influenced by a footnote in Buckley, most of the lower federal courts that
have considered whether a particular ad constitutes express or issue advo-
cacy have applied the so-called "magic words" test, limiting the definition
of express advocacy-and the scope of FECA regulation-to communica-
months of 1999 than during the same period in 1997. By contrast, party hard money
receipts were up only 16% compared to 1997).
45. See Public Disclosure, Inc., supra note 43.
46. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 (1976).
47. See Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77
Tex. L. Rev. 1751, 1751 (1999) (discussing issue advertisement that focused on candidate's
personal character and not issues).
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tions that literally ask voters to "vote for," "elect," "cast your ballot for,"
"vote against," or "defeat" a candidate. 48 Ads that effectively advocate or
oppose the cause of a candidate, but do not use the magic words, avoid
FECA's restrictions and requirements. 49
Unlike other uses of soft money, issue ads were initially the province
of non-party groups, particularly ideological organizations. In 1995, how-
ever, the Federal Election Commission ("FEC") determined that the Re-
publican National Committee ("RNC") could use soft money to partially
defray the costs of advertising that combined discussion of issues with crit-
icism of President Clinton by name.50 Subsequently, during the 1996
elections, both parties extensively utilized issue ads. The Democratic Na-
tional Committee ("DNC") undertook a multi-million dollar advertising
program to trumpet the accomplishments of the Clinton administration
and criticize the Republican Congress without explicitly calling for the
election or defeat of particular candidates. So, too, the RNC spent mil-
lions to pay for issue ads in support of the Dole campaign. These party
issue ads effectively eviscerated the presidential public funding spending
limits. 5 1 One early study estimated that the parties spent $68 million on
issue ads in the 1996 election cycle, 52 thereby accounting for nearly half
of all issue ad spending in that election. Another scholar recently esti-
mated that major party issue ad spending in 1995-96 equaled nearly $110
million.53 Similarly, party issue ad spending amounted to between $90
million and $110 million during the 1997-98 election cycle. 54 What
these figures mean is that party issue ad spending is now comparable to,
and possibly greater than, the total of party spending in donations to can-
didates, coordinated spending, and independent spending.55
48. Id. at 1754-59.
49. See id. at 1759-60.
50. See FEC Advisory Op. 1995-25 (1995).
51. See Robert Biersack & Melanie Haskell, Spitting on the Umpire: Political Parties,
the Federal Election Campaign Act, and the 1996 Campaigns, in Financing the 1996
Election 155, 177 (John C. Green ed., 1999).
52. Deborah Beck et al., Issue Advocacy Advertising During the 1996 Campaign 3, 34,
55 (1997).
53. See Paul S. Herrnson, Financing the 1996 Congressional Elections, in The State of
the Parties: The Changing Role of Contemporary American Parties, supra note 32, at 95,
122 [hereinafter Herrnson, Financing the 1996 Congressional Elections] (reporting that
DNC and the Democratic congressional committees spent $60 million on issue ads in
1995-96, while the RNC and Republican congressional committees spent $49 million).
54. Jeffrey D. Stanger & Douglas G. Rivlin, Issue Advocacy Advertising During the
1997-1998 Election Cycle 1-4 (1998) <http://appcpenn.org/issueads/report.htm> (on
file with the Columbia Law Review).
55. Party-coordinated and independent expenditures in the 1996 presidential
election came to $19.2 million. See Anthony Corrado, Financing the 1996 Presidential
General Election, in The State of the Parties: The Changing Role of Contemporary
American Parties, supra note 32, at 63, 75. Party contributions to candidates, coordinated
expenditures, and independent expenditures in the 1996 congressional elections came to
$70.9 million. See Biersack & Haskell, supra note 51, at 163. Total party contributions to,
coordinated expenditures with, and independent expenditures concerning federal
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By engaging in issue advocacy, the parties have vastly expanded their
ability to use soft money. No longer limited to building infrastructure or
to efforts ostensibly aimed at non-federal candidates, soft money can now
be deployed directly to pay for ads that aid a party's federal candidates.
Rapidly growing soft money collections-increasingly solicited by federal
officials, led by President Clinton-and the expansive new use for soft
money dramatically reinforced each other over the last two election
cycles.
The FEC's 1995 advisory opinion did place one important limit on
the use of soft money to fund issue advocacy: The opinion treated party
issue advocacy as a form of mixed federal/non-federal activity compara-
ble to administrative overhead or "generic voter drive costs."5 6 Under
FEC regulations, such mixed activities, which by their nature support
both federal and nonfederal candidates, must be financed by a specified
combination of hard and soft money. For the national party committees,
mixed spending must be funded 60% by hard money and 40% by soft
money in nonpresidential election years, and 65% by hard money and
35% by soft money in presidential election years.5 7 For state parties, the
hard/soft allocation is based on the federal share of the total number of
federal and state offices on the state ballot.58 In 1998, however, two party
committees sued the FEC, asserting that issue advocacy is entirely beyond
the scope of election regulation, so that any limit on the use of soft
money to fund issue advocacy is unconstitutional. The parties failed to
obtain injunctive relief in time for the 1998 elections, but the suit is still
pending.59 If the party committees prevail, party issue advocacy is likely
to surge, and with it, the demand for party soft money.
candidates in 1997-98 came to $40.8 million. See FEC, Political Party Fundraising
Continues to Climb, supra note 39.
56. See FEC Advisory Op. 1995-25 (1995). In its request for an advisory opinion
permitting the use of soft money to fund issue advocacy advertising, the Republican
National Committee had urged that such acts were party "administrative expenditures."
Party administrative expenditures are subject to FEC rules requiring the party to allocate its
expenses between federal and non-federal costs. The RNC did not contend that party
issue ads were completely beyond the scope of FECA regulation. The FEC determined that
the costs of the ads were either administrative expenditures or generic vote drive
expenditures. The Commission did not have to determine which category of expenditure
covered issue ads since both categories were subject to the same federal/non-federal
allocation formula.
57. See 11 C.F.R. § 106.5(b)(2) (2000).
58. As there are typically far more state than federal offices up for election in any
given state, the state parties may fund most of their issue advocacy spending with soft
money. To take advantage of this, the national party committees transferred tens of
millions of dollars of soft money to the state parties, so that the latter could use their
greater soft money allocation to pay for issue ads and other shared federal-nonfederal
expenses. See Jill Abramson & Leslie Wayne, Democrats Used the State Parties to Bypass
Limits, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1997, at Al; Biersack & Haskell, supra note 51, at 179-81.
59. Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, No. 98-5263, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 28505, at *3
(D.C. Cir., Nov. 6, 1998) (affirming district court order denying preliminary injunction
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II. PARTY MONEY AND THE BUcKLEY DOCTRINE
A. The Constitutional Issues and the Conflicting Models of the Parties'
Campaign Role
1. Independent Spending. - Together party independent spending,
party soft money, and party issue advocacy have undermined many of the
basic elements of FECA, specifically the dollar and source limits on cam-
paign contributions, the limits on party support for candidates, and the
spending limits on coordinated expenditures that are built into the presi-
dential public funding system. These same practices would be equally
subversive of any public funding program Congress might adopt for con-
gressional elections, and of state-level public funding initiatives for state
elections.
The Buckley doctrine appears to raise serious constitutional objec-
tions to any legislative efforts to curtail party independent spending or
party issue advocacy. The distinction between coordinated spending,
which is treated as a contribution and may be subject to limitation, and
independent spending, which is immune from limitation, is a central ele-
ment of Buckley. 60 Moreover, in Colorado Republican, a Supreme Court
plurality specifically determined that parties are capable of independent
spending and that such party spending is entitled to the same constitu-
tional protection as independent spending by individuals or PACs. 61 So,
too, the line between express advocacy and issue advocacy is central to
Buckley, 62 and there is nothing in the Court's campaign finance cases in-
dicating that party issue ads are less protected than the issue ads of other
organizations. 63
Legislative restrictions on soft money would appear to be less vulner-
able to constitutional challenge. Soft money involves contributions to the
parties, rather than spending by the parties, and a fundamental element
against application of FEC soft money allocation regulation to party issue advocacy
expenditures).
60. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 46-47 (1976).
61. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 613-23
(1996).
62. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41-44, 76-80; see also FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for
Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 248-50 (1986) (citing Buckley).
63. The ads in Colorado Republican were arguably issue advocacy since they criticized a
candidate's record but did not expressly call for his defeat. Indeed, the district court held
that the ads were not express advocacy. See FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign
Comm., 839 F. Supp. 1448, 1454 (D. Colo. 1993). The Tenth Circuit held that the ads
contained an "electioneering message" within the meaning of an FEC advisory opinion
that provided that such messages by parties are subject to FECA's limits on coordinated
spending. FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 59 F.3d 1015, 1021-22
(10th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The court suggested that the concept of express
advocacy could be interpreted more broadly when applied to party speech, but its opinion
also assumed that parties are incapable of engaging in independent expenditures. See id.
at 1024. The latter assumption was, of course, reversed by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court did not discuss whether the Colorado Republican ads might be issue
advocacy.
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of Buckley, most recently reconfirmed by Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Govern-
ment PAC,64 is that contributions present special dangers of corruption
that warrant limitation. Moreover, the principal providers of soft money
are corporations and the Court has specifically upheld bans on the use of
corporate treasury funds in candidate elections. 65
Nevertheless, constitutional arguments have been raised against leg-
islation that would curtail soft money. First, Professor Bradley A. Smith
has argued that soft money used to fund issue advocacy is constitutionally
exempt from limitation since issue advocacy, by definition, is political
speech immune from regulation. 6 6 In his view, as issue advocacy spend-
ing is protected from regulation by the First Amendment, the contribu-
tions that fund such spending must be constitutionally protected as well.
Second, going beyond issue advocacy, the case for limiting soft money
donations to the parties relies on the foundational assumption that there
is something corrupting about party spending. The need for a danger of
corruption to justify a contribution limitation was made clear in Citizens
Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, where the Court relied on its previ-
ous determination that spending on ballot propositions raises no possibil-
ity of corruption (as there was no candidate to corrupt) to hold unconsti-
tutional an ordinance restricting donations to committees that support or
oppose such ballot propositions. 67 If party spending cannot corrupt,
then, under his logic, contributions to parties may not be limited either.
In Colorado Republican, several members of the Supreme Court denied
that party support for candidates presents a danger of corruption within
the meaning of Buckley. Instead of joining the plurality and protecting
the party ads in that case as independent expenditures, Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas would have invali-
dated FECA's limits on party coordinated expenditures. 68 On remand, a
district judge did exactly that.69 Although these opinions focused on co-
ordinated spending limits, they also raise questions about the limits on
party contributions to candidates -since both FECA and Buckley treat
64. 120 S.Ct. 897 (2000).
65. See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 652-53 (1990); FEC
v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 197 (1982).
66. See Bradley A. Smith, Soft Money, Hard Realities: The Constitutional Prohibition
of a Soft Money Ban, 24J. Legis. 179, 196-99 (1998). In February 2000, President Clinton
nominated Professor Smith to be a member of the Federal Election Commission.
67. National Right to Work, 454 U.S. 290, 298-99 (1981).
68. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 626-31
(1996) (Kennedy. J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Scalia, J. concurring in the judgment
and dissenting in part); id. at 644-48 (Thomas, J. joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Scalia, J.
concurring in judgment and dissenting in part).
69. FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 41 F. Supp. 2d 1197,
1210-13 (D. Colo. 1999) (noting that "communications via coordinated expenditures
implicate core First Amendment rights"). As this Article was going to press, a divided
panel of the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. See Colorado Republican
Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, No. 99-1211, 2000 WL 554688 (10th Cir. May 5, 2000).
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coordinated expenditures and contributions as legally equivalent-and,
ultimately, perhaps the limits on contributions to the parties as well.
Strikingly, the constitutional challenges to limits on party money
flow from diametrically opposing visions of the parties and, especially, of
the relationships among parties and candidates. On the one hand, the
defense of party independent spending and party issue advocacy assumes
a sharp separation between the parties and their candidates. If a party
committee functioned as a candidate's campaign organization, then all
spending by that committee, whether or not technically coordinated with
a candidate, would be considered coordinated spending. Similarly, if a
party committee served as an arm of the candidate's campaign organiza-
tion then all its advertising, even ads lacking the magic words of express
advocacy, would be express advocacy for constitutional purposesjust as all
campaign expenditures by a candidate are considered to be express advo-
cacy even if the candidate's ads do not say "vote for me" or "vote against
my opponent." Strong constitutional protection of such activity assumes
that parties are sharply distinct from their candidates, resembling in this
way all other campaign intermediaries. In effect, the argument against
limits on party independent spending and party issue advocacy assumes
that parties are like PACs and are entitled to the same protections af-
forded to PACs.
By contrast, the constitutional argument against limits on direct
party support for candidates, and the implicit challenge to limits on do-
nations to parties, assumes that parties are quite different from other
campaign finance intermediaries. Parties, unlike PACs, are considered to
be uniquely close to, if not identical with, their candidates. The close
party-candidate relationship is said to eliminate the possibility of party-
candidate quid pro quos so that party participation in campaigns cannot
present danger of corruption. Indeed, limiting party support for candi-
dates would be like limiting candidates' support for their own campaigns,
which is unconstitutional under Buckley.
Both critiques of limiting party money cannot be right. Indeed, I
believe both are wrong. Although, as noted in Part I, FECA to some ex-
tent models its regulation of parties on its treatment of PACs, the major
political parties are not PACs. To mechanically apply constitutional dis-
tinctions developed in the PAC context makes little sense and is a recipe
for wholesale evasion of the campaign finance laws. Further, by closely
linking private donors, party committees, and officeholders, party fun-
draising practices directly implicate the corruption concerns that Buckley
placed at the center of our campaign finance regime.
B. Party Spending and the Limits of the PAC Model
1. Independent Spending. - The principal decision illustrating the
parties-as-PACs model is the plurality opinion of Justice Breyer, joined by
Justices O'Connor and Souter, in Colorado Republican, which found that
party committee spending, like PAC spending, can be subject to limits
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only if it is in fact coordinated with a candidate's campaign. 70 Relying on
earlier cases that had invalidated limits on independent expenditures by
PACs,71 the plurality could "not see how a provision that limits a political
party's independent expenditures can escape their controlling effect. '7 2
But the justifications for constitutional protection for PAC or individ-
ual spending are not implicated by spending by party committees. First,
individuals and non-party organizations participating in a campaign may
have interests other than, or in addition to, the election of the candidate
they are backing or the defeat of the candidate they are attacking. They
may use their expenditures to highlight an issue in order to send a
message, or to persuade the voters to send a message, on that issue. It
may be as important to them to make the election a referendum on abor-
tion, or to emphasize that their opposition to a candidate stems from her
position on term limits, as to express a position on which candidate
should be elected. Their critical issues may include matters candidates
prefer to ignore. Indeed, by airing certain messages an independent
committee's advertising may be at odds with the campaign strategy of the
very candidate it is backing.
The major parties, by contrast, do not have any electoral agenda
other than election of their candidates. "The defining mission focus of
political parties in the contemporary era is to elect candidates to of-
fice." 73 Major party advertising expressly advocating the election or de-
feat of a candidate-the type of advertising funded by independent
spending-is not intended to raise issues that differ from those advanced
by the party's candidates, or to elect candidates with a particular policy
mandate. Its goal is, simply, to elect candidates affiliated with the party.
Second, Buckley found, and FEC v. National Conservative Political Action
Committee ("NCPAC")74 reiterated, that independent expenditures raise
little danger of a candidate-financial supporter quid pro quo, which is the
constitutional basis for the power to restrict contributions, because the
"absence of prearrangement and coordination.., undermines the value
of the expenditure to the candidate. ' 75 This might be true for an in-
dependent expenditure by an individual or interest group that is institu-
tionally distinct from the candidate. In the absence of an ongoing rela-
70. See Colorado Republican, 518 U.S. at 613-23.
71. See id. at 615 (citing Buckley and FEC v. National Conservative Political Action
Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985), for proposition that "restrictions on independent
expenditures... 'represent substantial restraints on the quantity and diversity of political
speech'").
72. Id.
73. William Crotty, Political Parties in the 1996 Election: The Party as Team or the
Candidates as Superstars?, in The Parties Respond: Changes in American Parties and
Campaigns 203 (L. Sandy Maisel, ed., 1998). See also Herrnson, Party Campaigning in the
1980s, supra note 9, at 8 ("The principal aim of American political parties has always been
to elect candidates to public office.").
74. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
75. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976).
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tionship between candidate and independent supporter, the supporter's
advertising could hit the wrong themes, or be redundant rather than sup-
plement candidate spending. But there will typically be preexisting ties
between the party organization and the candidate who holds the party's
nomination.
Party committees frequently aid candidates in hiring campaign man-
agers, consultants, media and pollsters, so that parties and their commit-
tees often engage the services of the same political professionals. Party
committees provide their candidates with issue and opposition research
and poll and focus group data, and they assist candidates with their fun-
draising. 76 Party committees and candidates share pollsters, campaign
strategists, and media consultants; campaign professionals shuttle back
and forth among party committees, candidate committees, and consult-
ing firms. Even when they do not sit down to discuss the placement or
content of a specific ad, parties and their candidates are structurally inte-
grated, not independent. 77 As a result, party efforts on behalf of a candi-
date are likely to be quite valuable to the candidate even in the absence
of formal coordination.
The ability of parties to combine a close structural relationship with
a candidate while maintaining the notional independence of a particular
advertising campaign is nicely illustrated by the recent federal district
court decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. Pauly.78 The Minnesota
Republican Party provided state candidates with "'meaningful and help-
ful' service and 'direct support,"' kept in "' close contact' with 'elected
officials and statewide campaigns,"' "'work[ed] directly with Republican
candidates on issue research,' 'develop[ed] campaign plans,' and 'man-
age [d] the scheduling of candidate and party activity.' 79 On "numerous
occasions" candidates who had been endorsed by the party attended
party fundraisers, and the party encouraged its candidates to attend bi-
weekly "coordinating meetings" at party headquarters. The party also
made direct contributions to its candidates.80 But when the party took
out its own advertising in support of its nominees, the party officials re-
sponsible for the ads avoided direct contact with the candidates. As a
result, the party's ads were considered to be independent expenditures,
not subject to limitation.81 Although the district court found the "record
in this case [to be] replete with examples of cooperation," there was no
76. See, e.g., Herrnson, Financing the 1996 Congressional Elections, supra note 53, at
100 (discussing the involved role of parties in Senate and House elections).
77. See Jonathan Bernstein & Raymond J. La Raja, Independent Expenditures and
Partisanship in House Elections 15-16 (1999) (unpublished paper prepared for delivery at
1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Sept. 2-5, 1999) (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (concluding that "outsider ads sponsored by political
parties are signs of party integration").
78. 63 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (D. Minn. 1999).
79. Id. at 1010-11 (citation ommited).
80. Id. at 1012.
81. See id. at 1016.
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evidence of "actual coordination" of the particular expenditures in ques-
tion with candidates. 82
Certainly, parties are organizationally distinct from their candidates,
and it is technically possible, as Colorado Republican suggested, for a party
committee to support a candidate by engaging in spending that is not
coordinated with the candidate's campaign. But the party's relationship
to its candidate is very different from that between a PAC and a candidate
the PAC is backing. The party includes its candidate. The candidate is
typically a member of the party, has been active in the party, and, once
nominated, bears the party label, uses the party's place on the ballot, and
necessarily benefits from the loyalty and support of party activists. In this
way, candidates are far more tightly linked to their respective parties than
they are to other politically active organizations that may engage in in-
dependent spending.
But, as Pauly reveals, the judicial notion of party independent spend-
ing pays scant attention to the actual relationships among parties and
candidates. Given the structural integration and shared institutional in-
terests of parties and candidates, the doctrine of party independent
spending makes little sense. Certainly, the notion of independence
should be construed far more narrowly, and the presumption of coordi-
nation should be far stronger, when party spending is at issue.
2. Issue Advocacy. - The application of the express advocacy/issue
advocacy distinction to the parties implicates similar concerns. As previ-
ously noted, this distinction derives from the Supreme Court's recogni-
tion that some doctrinal means is needed to permit regulation of elec-
tion-related spending while simultaneously preserving the fundamental
First Amendment value of immunizing non-election-related political
speech from regulation. The line the Court drew between express advo-
cacy and all other political speech reflects the desire for a test that is both
crisp, thereby avoiding vagueness and the chilling effect that can result
from vague regulation, and narrow, thus minimizing any interference
with other political speech.
The Court's particular distinction between express advocacy and
other speech may make some sense with respect to individuals and
groups, such as PACs, that participate in politics in order to advance cer-
tain issue agendas, protect certain interests, or affect public policy. For
them, election-related activity may be only one of a number of tech-
niques-including legislative lobbying, the use of op-eds or think tank
research targeting opinion leaders, advertising aimed at influencing pub-
lic opinion more generally, or grass-roots organizing used to affect the
political process. Some narrow definition of election-related speech is
necessary to protect these other forms of political speech and activity,
which can have indirect effects on elections, from the constraints of
FECA. The narrow express advocacy test enables such actors to discuss
82. Id.
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
political issues and policy goals by reference to particular elected officials
and candidates without fearing that they will be subject to FECA's report-
ing requirements and contribution and spending rules. The current defi-
nition of express advocacy may be too narrow-and may enable many
plainly election-related ad campaigns to evade FECA's rules and require-
ments-but the need for a definition of election-related speech that pro-
vides ample protection for issue speech is apparent.
The major political parties, particularly the national and congres-
sional campaign committees, are, however, quite different from other po-
litically active groups. Party committee spending aims almost exclusively
at promoting the election of party candidates to office and thereby secur-
ing or maintaining party political power. This is not to say that the major
parties have no interest in ideology, or that they do not have the same
right as other organizations to discuss issues. To the contrary, the two
great national parties were founded for ideological reasons, and contem-
porary party activists often have strong ideological bents. No doubt many
people who choose to become active in party organizations do so in the
belief that by helping their party win power they are advancing their own
policy views. Party spending that is exclusively about issues is rightly enti-
tled to the same constitutional protection that non-election-related
spending by other groups or individuals enjoys. But most party spending
is aimed at electing party candidates. When PACs and other politically
active groups combine discussions of issues and candidates, it may not be
clear whether they are doing so to advance their issues agenda or elect
candidates, but when parties couple issue discussions with references to
candidates their goal is almost certainly the election of their candidates.
Indeed, in the last two election cycles, the content of party issue ad-
vertising was often indistinguishable from both party express advocacy
ads and the candidates' own ads. As one recent study of campaign ads
found, "some of the Democratic Party issue ads that helped Bill Clinton
in 1995 used the same film clips and some of the same voiceovers as the
Clinton campaign ads-indeed, they were distinguishable only by their
failure to call explicitly for the president's reelection."83 Some ads that
appeared in 1996 were run both as "express" ads paid for by the presiden-
tial campaigns and as "issue" ads paid for by party committees. "With the
exception of a 'tag' line, these ads were exactly the same. '8 4 A content
analysis of party issue ads and candidate ads in one 1996 Senate race
found that the ads were quite similar. Both contained discussions of cam-
paign issues, with "only small differences in the extent to which candidate
ads and party ads highlight issues. '8 5 Both avoided use of the "magic
words" of express advocacy and, instead made only subtle or indirect ref-
83. Wesley Joe & Clyde Wilcox, Financing the 1996 Presidential Nominations: The
Last Regulated Campaign?, in Financing the 1996 Election, supra note 45, at 37, 61.
84. Biersack & Haskell, supra note 51, at 177.
85. Herrnson & Dwyre, supra note 32, at 98.
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erences, if any references at all, to the upcoming election.8 6 Both used
the same visual and audio production techniques. Party ads used "slow-
motion, black-and-white, blurry footage," and "grainy and fearful images"
of candidates of the other party, and sought to visually link those candi-
dates with undesirable groups, like criminals or gang members.8 7 "The
use of such a technique by the parties in issue advocacy ads gives those
ads a distinctly campaign-like flavor, further confirming their intent to
influence the outcome of an election rather than merely to educate vot-
ers about some policy issue."8 8
Party issue ad spending is, in practice, not a means for politically
active, independent citizens to increase the discussion of issues in public
life, but rather an integral part of candidate-election strategies. The pur-
pose of party issue advocacy is simply to avoid the spending limits on
publicly funded presidential candidates and on coordinated expendi-
tures for congressional candidates, and to spend money obtained in con-
tributions that do not comply with FECA's restrictions. In reports re-
leased in the fall of 1998, FEC auditors found that the DNC and the
Clinton-Gore '96 campaign had worked together on the production and
placement of television ads paid for by the DNC, and that the party and
the candidates' committee shared a standard form memorandum for au-
thorization of production and purchase of air time for media advertising:
"One section of this memorandum states 'The cost will be allocated a
_% for the DNC and _% for Clinton-Gore '96.' The next line states
'attorneys to determine." 89 The FEC general counsel found that it was
"difficult to distinguish between the activities of the DNC and the [Clin-
ton] Primary Committee with respect to the creation and publication of
the media advertisements at issue."90 FEC auditors also found that the
RNC paid more than $18 million directly and through Republican state
committees on behalf of the Dole campaign for ads that were aired be-
tween April and August 1996, a period in which Dole was bumping up
against the spending ceiling he had accepted as a condition for receiving
86. Id. at 94-96. Both candidates and parties appear to have absorbed a central
lesson of modern advertising, that indirect appeals can be far more effective than direct
exhortation to buy a product. As Justice Ann Walsh Bradley of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court recently observed,
Few advertisements will directly say 'Buy Nike rather than Reebok' or 'Drink
Maxwell House coffee.' Be they in the print or electronic media, advertisements
normally do not include a call for action or use 'magic words' to relay their
message. Yet every reader, listener, or viewer knows that 'Less filling, tastes great'
is an unambiguous exhortation to purchase a particular type of Miller beer, and
'They're Gr-r-reat' is Tony the Tiger's unambiguous appeal to buy a box of sugar-
coated corn flakes.
Elections Bd. ofWis. v. Wisconsin Mfrs & Commerce, 597 N.W.2d 721, 742-43 (Wis. 1999).
87. Herrnson & Dwyre, supra note 32, at 99.
88. Id. at 99.
89. FEC, Report of the Audit Division on Clinton/Gore '96 Primary Committee, Inc.
18 (1998).
90. Id. at 108.
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public funding.9 1 In 1998, again, party issue ads "reinforced the themes
and messages of their candidates."92 When skillfully done, issue ads
demonstrated "seamless party/candidate communication" on such topics
as taxes, drugs, and education. 93 "This consistency assisted voters [to]
remember the candidate's agenda."9 4
To be sure, some advertising broadcast or published by party com-
mittees can be just about issues. As previously indicated, such speech
must be protected from governmental regulation. But, as with the coor-
dinated/independent distinction, the intensive focus of party spending
on election campaigns and the close, ongoing institutional connection
between party candidates and party campaign committees suggests that in
the party context, Buckley's goals of regulating election-related speech
while protecting issue speech may be more effectively vindicated by a def-
inition of election-related speech that is broader than would be constitu-
tionally acceptable for speech by PACs, other non-party groups, or politi-
cally-active individuals. Such a shift is necessary if the other goals of
campaign finance law-restrictions on large donations, the prohibition
on corporate and union contributions, the spending ceilings that are part
of public funding-are to be protected from the issue advocacy end-run
around FECA.
C. Parties and Corruption: The Contributor-Party-Candidate Relationship
The claim that party money does not present a danger of corruption
poses a potentially far more serious constitutional objection to regulating
party money than does the analogy between parties and PACs. Under the
view of parties-as-PACs, party coordinated expenditures may be limited
and express advocacy must be funded by hard money. But if party money
presents no danger of corruption, then there is no longer any basis for
limiting either donations to parties or the financial support provided by
parties to their candidates.
The argument that party money cannot be corrupting assumes two
forms. The first claims that the tight ties linking a party to its candi-
dates-the very ties that distinguish parties from PACs and make the no-
tion of party independent spending so implausible-prevent the parties
from exerting a corrupting influence on their candidates. This argument
is theoretically shaky, but may be correct in practice. The second recog-
nizes that parties get their money from private donors who may wish to
channel money to specific candidates in order to evade FECA's limits on
91. See FEC, Report of the Audit Division on the Dole for President Committee, Inc.
(Primary) 16-17, 34-37, 46 (1998).
92. David B. Magleby & Marianne Holt eds., Outside Money: Soft Money & Issue Ads
In Competitive 1998 Congressional Elections (1998) <http://www.byu.edu/
outsidemoney/mono.htm> (unpublished report of a grant funded by the Pew Charitable
Trusts, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
93. Id.
94. Id.
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direct donations to candidates, but argues that the large number of do-
nors to and variety of interests represented by a party serve to dilute any
corruptive potential. This argument is attractive in theory but is seriously
undermined by current campaign finance practices.
1. Party Influence Over Candidates. - A strong version of the argu-
ment that a party is incapable of corrupting its candidates was articulated
by Justice Kennedy in his Colorado Republican separate opinion. Justice
Kennedy claimed that there is "a practical identity of interests" between
party and candidate such that party spending in support of a candidate,
including spending coordinated with the candidate, "is indistinguishable
in substance from expenditures by the candidate or his campaign com-
mittee."95 As a result, limiting party support for its candidate would be
like limiting the candidate's own campaign spending-which Buckley
held to be unconstitutional. 9 6 Alternatively, given "It]he party's form of
organization and the fact that its fate in an election is inextricably inter-
twined with that of its candidates," 97 a party could no more corrupt its
candidates than it could corrupt itself. Limiting party support for candi-
dates, then, would be analogous to limiting a candidate's ability to use
her personal wealth to fund her campaign. Buckley, however, invalidated
the FECA provision that would have limited candidates' use of personal
funds precisely because the latter presented no danger of corruption. 98
Justice Thomas, writing for himself, ChiefJustice Rehnquist, and Jus-
tice Scalia in their separate Colorado Republican opinion, advanced a less
extreme version of this argument. He argued that even if a party commit-
tee uses its funds to influence a candidate, there is nothing wrong-noth-
ing "corrupting"-about that: "The very aim of a political party is to in-
fluence its candidate's stance on issues and, if the candidate takes office
or is reelected, his votes."99 A party's exercise of influence over its candi-
dates and officeholders is not "'subversion of the political process,"' but
"successful advocacy of ideas in the political marketplace and representa-
tive government in a party system. 100
Other judges have expressed similar views about the positive effects
of party influence on candidates. In 1981, when a unanimous Supreme
Court upheld the validity of party agency agreements, 10 1 it observed ap-
provingly that such agreements could lead to a more effective use of party
resources in support of party candidates, which "may encourage candi-
95. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 630 (1996)
(Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment and
dissenting in part).
96. See id. (citing Buckley's invalidation of FECA's limits on candidate's campaign
expenditures).
97. Id.
98. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 53 (1976).
99. Colorado Republican, 518 U.S. at 646.
100. Id. (citation omitted).
101. See supra text accompanying note 20 for a description of party agency
agreements.
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date loyalty and responsiveness to the party."'10 2 In striking FECA's caps
on coordinated spending in the Colorado Republican remand, moreover,
District Judge Nottingham concluded that party use of coordinated ex-
penditures to influence candidates could not be viewed as "an attempt to
exert improper influence. 10 3 In a recent decision, the Tenth Circuit
agreed that there is "nothing pernicious" about a party's efforts at "shap-
ing the views of its candidates." 10 4
Many political scientists also emphasize the benefits of greater party
influence over candidates. They argue that greater party cohesion could
facilitate concerted action across the separate branches of government
and make the party labels on candidates more meaningful to voters. This
would make it easier for voters to judge the record of the party in power,
compare the programs of competing parties, and cast ballots based on
policies rather than candidate personalities. Indeed, a group of distin-
guished political scientists, writing as the Committee for Party Renewal,
submitted an amicus brief in Colorado Republican urging that "[p] olitical
party support is not corruptive .... ,,105
The argument that parties, by definition, cannot corrupt their candi-
dates is debatable in theory. Certainly, Justice Kennedy notwithstanding,
parties and candidates are not literally identical. Party committees and
candidates can differ over campaign strategies and policy issues. Party
committees, like other campaign donors, could seek to leverage their
funds to induce a candidate to take certain positions on pending legisla-
tive issues, to harmonize her campaign with national party themes, or
even to hire certain campaign professionals. Party committees might try
to do this in order to attract more contributions and other forms of sup-
port for the party from PACs, individuals, and politically active ideologi-
cal or special interest groups. Because a national party committee is con-
cerned with a wide range of elections across the country, and with
securing power at the national level, rather than with any one candidate's
particular fate, the party's interests might conceivably diverge from those
of a candidate in a particular race.
Nor are party efforts to influence candidate issue positions necessar-
ily desirable given the longstanding tradition in our political culture of
looking at party organizations and party bosses with skepticism, if not
fear. From Madison's condemnation of faction, to the Progressive Era
drive to use the primary to break the hold of party machines, 0 6 to con-
102. FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 42 (1981).
103. FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 41 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1212
(D. Colo. 1999).
104. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, No. 99-1211, 2000 WL
554688, at *10 (10th Cir. May 5, 2000).
105. Brief Amicus Curiae Committee for Party Renewal at 16, Colorado Republican
Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996) (No. 95-489).
106. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 24, at 155-56 (describing the direct primary as the
"institutionalized means" of pursuing politics in "a civic culture that is broadly hostile to
party organizational control").
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temporary public sentiments, caught in opinion polling, which indicate a
preference for voting the candidate and not the party,10 7 there is a strong
commitment in the American system to the independence of candidates
and officeholders from party control. Justice Stevens, in his Colorado Re-
publican dissent, adverted to this when he voiced concern that "the
party-or the persons who control the party-will abuse the influence it
has over the candidate by virtue of its power to spend."10 8 The emer-
gence of candidate-centered politics in the twentieth century is at least in
part a reflection of this popular sentiment and of institutional arrange-
ments, such as the direct primary and the primary open to non-party vot-
ers, intended to implement that sentiment.
Still, in practice, those who argue that party money does not present
a serious danger of undue party influence over candidates may be right.
Studies of party campaign committees have found that the parties strive
not to influence or control their candidates, but rather to serve them and
thereby help to elect them. 10 9 A national party committee typically has
"little interest in ideological 'litmus tests' and instead provides assistance
to candidates based on their chance of winning. Candidate assistance is
apportioned according to fulfillment by the candidates of non-policy cri-
teria, such as individual fund-raising levels and favorable polling num-
bers."'110 This candidate-election focus of party organizations is con-
nected to some of the central characteristics of contemporary politics:
107. See Martin P. Wattenberg, The Rise of Candidate-Centered Politics: Presidential
Elections of the 1980s 34 (1991) ("Most pervasive is the belief that one should vote for the
candidate, not the party."); see also State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 626
(Alaska 1999) ("The natural tendency of successful candidates who receive unlimited
contributions from a party would be to reduce independent consideration of issues and
adhere to positions taken by the party itself.").
108. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 648 (1996)
(Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.); see also FEC v. National Republican
Senatorial Comm., 761 F. Supp. 813, 821-22 & n.12 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd on other
grounds, 966 F.2d 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Here, the Court found that it is "entirely
plausible" that spending limits on party committees "serve[ ] the anti-corruption purposes
identified by Congress and approved by the Supreme Court in Buckley" and that "Congress,
by setting contribution limits from the parties to candidates has apparently concluded that
too much responsiveness to the parties, if obtained by unrestricted contributions, is
undesirable.")
109. See, e.g., John H. Aldrich, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of
Political Parties in America 269-74 (1995) (describing the "rise of the party in service to its
candidates"); John F. Bibby, State Party Organizations: Coping and Adapting to
Candidate-Centered Politics and Nationalization, in The Parties Respond: Changes in
American Parties and Campaigns 24 (L. Sandy Maisel ed., 1998).
According to Frank Sorauf, "the party as funder rarely, if ever, asks questions of
program or issue commitment of those it helps; the question is electability, not loyalty to
party programs or issue positions." Frank J. Sorauf, What Buckley Wrought?, in If Buckley
Fell: A First Amendment Blueprint for Regulating Money in Politics 11, 24 (E. Joshua
Rosenkranz ed., 1999).
110. Robert G. Boatright, "You Don't Know Me, but Here I Am": Congressional
Candidates and Party Strength, in The State of the Parties: The Changing Role of
Contemporary American Parties, supra note 32, at 320, 323.
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the relative weakness of partisanship within the electorate, the closeness
of the conflict between the major parties over the control of national
political institutions, and the increased salience of partisanship within the
government.
With party loyalty in the electorate declining, partisan control of the
Presidency and Congress up for grabs, and the determination of party
control having a major impact on government operations, party organiza-
tions-particularly the Senate and House campaign committees, which
are actually composed of elected officials-are constrained to make win-
ning, rather than ideological purity their primary, if not exclusive,
goal.11 Congressional party committees participate in elections to pro-
tect or gain seats for their party in their respective legislative chamber so
that the party can organize the chamber and reap the benefits flowing
from control over committee assignments and the legislative agenda.
Their interest in legislative power binds them far more tightly to their
candidates than ideological affinity or voting records links ideological
groups to the candidates they back. Ideological groups can try to use
their power to grant or withhold funds to influence officeholder actions.
But with the success of party committees closely tied up with the election
of party candidates, it is unlikely-as studies of party committees show-
that these committees will use their funds to advance any goal other than
the electoral success of their candidates.
To be sure, if the current limits on party spending were invali-
dated-or the growing role of party spending outside of FECA were to
render the statutory limits completely irrelevant' 12-the potential for
party organizations to exert influence over party officeholders might
grow. 113 But at the moment, the danger that party officials will use their
A study of state legislative campaign committees ("LCCs") also found that "there is
little evidence to suggest LCC resources are used as a reward or punishment for legislative
behavior." Daniel M. Shea, Transforming Democracy: Legislative Campaign Committees
and Political Parties 29 (1995); see also Gierzynski, supra note 21, at 122 ("[T]here is no
attempt to increase party cohesion by distributing resources on the basis of party loyalty or
ideology.").
111. This is nicely illustrated by the strategic advice the National Republican
Campaign Committee gave to a Republican Congressional candidate in 1990 to vote
against Republican President Bush's tax plan, and the assistance it gave to the House
candidate in preparing ads that highlighted the candidate's opposition to his own party's
president. See Kolodny, supra note 25, at 185.
112. Cf. Mariani v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 2d 352, 420-21 (M.D. Pa. 1999)
(certifying to appellate court the question of whether FECA's ban on corporate
contributions in federal elections is unconstitutional "in the context of the presently
existing law that otherwise permits corporations to expend unlimited amounts of
corporate treasury funds" in soft money). As this Article was going to press the Third
Circuit determined that FECA's ban on corporate contributions remains valid
notwithstanding corporate soft money donations. See Mariani v. United States, No.99-
3875, 2000 WL 637394 (3d Cir. May 18, 2000) (en banc).
113. See, e.g., Sorauf, supra note 109, at 32. In fact, many of the studies of state LCCs
that found that these organizations focus almost exclusively on electability, not ideology or
party loyalty, involved states in which there are no limits on party contributions to state
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control over party campaign treasuries to unduly influence party office-
holders does not, by itself, seem sufficiently serious to justify limits on
party support for candidates.
2. Dilution or Concentration? Private Contributors, the Parties, and the
Candidates. - The more compelling issue of corruption posed by party
money is not undue party influence over candidates, but rather, the abil-
ity of private donors to use the parties as a means of evading the limits on
donors' contributions to candidates. Party committees raise their money
from private donors. With relatively tight limits on direct donations by
individuals and PACs to candidates, donors could give money to the par-
ties to circumvent those limits, or to supplement the money that is given
under the limits. The party could, in effect, serve as a conduit for passing
along contributions from private donors to candidates.
In California Medical Association v. FEC, the Supreme Court upheld
FECA's limits on donations by a parent organization to its own PAC on
just this theory.1 1 4 Given that FECA allows a parent organization to set
policy for its PAC,' 1 5 there would seem to be no stronger instance of
donor-recipient identity, and no weaker case for donor-recipient corrup-
tion, than this one. But the Court reasoned that although an organiza-
tion's donation to its own PAC presents no danger of corruption in itself,
if contributions by the organization to the PAC were unlimited the organ-
ization might, in effect, give through its PAC in order to circumvent the
limits on the organization's direct contributions to candidates. 116 Thus,
contributions by an organization to its PAC can be limited in order to
.protect the integrity of the contribution restrictions" on donations to
candidates.' 1 7 Similarly, the prevention of such "conduit corruption"
provides a constitutional foundation for limiting both party support for
candidates and private donor support for parties.
In their Colorado Republican amicus brief, however, the political scien-
tists in the Committee for Party Renewal denied that unlimited party
spending presented a danger of conduit corruption. As they put it: "Par-
ties are too large and too diverse to be controlled by any special interest.
The old rule of sanitary engineers applies: the solution to pollution is
dilution."118 Justice Thomas, in his Colorado Republican opinion, agreed,
legislative candidates. In 1996, in 31 states, there were no limits on party contributions to
candidates for the lower house of the state legislature in 31 states. See Malbin & Gais,
supra note 33, at 17-19.
114. 453 U.S. 182, 197 (1981).
115. See 11 C.F.R. § 114.5(d) (1999), FEC Advisory Op. 1975-23 (1975); see also
Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 415-17 (1972).
116. California Med. Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 198-99.
117. Id. at 199 (plurality opinion). See also id. at 202-04 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
118. Brief Amicus Curiae for Committee for Party Renewal at 17, Colorado
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996) (No. 95-489). In its
decision invalidating FECA's coordinated expenditure limitations, the Tenth Circuit
closely paraphrased the Committee for Party Renewal's Supreme Court brief, determining
that "[p]arties are simply too large and too diverse to be corrupted by any one faction."
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stating that American political parties have "numerous members with a
wide variety of interests," thus ensuring that "the influence of any one
person or the importance of any single issue within a political party is
significantly diffused," and that "there is little risk that an individual do-
nor could use a party as a conduit for bribing candidates."1 9 On re-
mand, Judge Nottingham reached a similar conclusion, finding "contrib-
utor-to-party-to-candidate pressure" to be "an unlikely avenue of
corruption."' 120
By contrast, decisions of two state supreme courts and one federal
district court have relied on the possibility of conduit corruption in up-
holding the constitutionality of state laws limiting party donations to can-
didates in state races. The Wisconsin Supreme Court looked to the legis-
lative history of the state's campaign finance law, which discussed the
danger that PACs could evade the limits on their donations to candidates
by using the parties as conduits for PAC funds.12 1 The Alaska Supreme
Court cited an affidavit from a former governor of the state who stated
"that pass-throughs (donations to a party that are earmarked for a candi-
date) under the pre-reform system 'made a mockery of contribution lim-
its and turned political parties into money launderers.' "'122 A federal dis-
trict court in Colorado upheld that state's restriction on party spending
in support of candidates because of evidence that the state's Republican
party had been used as a conduit for PAC contributions to candidates.1 2 3
See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, No. 99-1211, 2000 WL 554688, at
*10 (10th Cir. May 5, 2000).
119. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 647 (1996)
(Thomas J., concurring).
120. FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 41 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1211
(D. Colo. 1999).
Judge Nottingham defined corruption narrowly as a literal exchange of dollars for
legislative votes, and rejected the idea that corruption could include more indirect
influences of campaign contributions on legislative decisionmaking. See id. at 1209-11.
There is evidence, however, that campaign contributions have their primary impact on
legislative participation in committees. Contributions make it more likely that members
will work actively to support the interests of donors, for example by proposing and
supporting amendments, opposing hostile amendments, or participating in a committee
mark-up. See Richard L. Hall & Frank W. Wayman, Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and
the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees, 84 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 797, 810
(1990). Such action may be as valuable to donors as votes on the floor of Congress.
121. See Gard v. Wisconsin State Elections Bd., 456 N.W.2d 809, 814-15 (Wis. 1990).
122. State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597, 626 (Ak. 1999). The Alaska
Supreme Court also upheld limits imposed by the state legislature on contributions to the
parties. See id. at 625.
123. Citizens for Responsible Gov't State Political Action v. Buckley, 60 F. Supp. 2d
1066, 1080-81 (D. Colo. 1999). The court also found that limits on contributions to the
parties "are an appropriate means by which to protect the integrity of the entire system of
campaign contributions," but determined that the specific dollar contribution limit in the
Colorado law was lower than could be justified by the purpose of preventing corruption.
See id. at 1088-89.
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Certainly, the national party committees have the capacity to launder
donations. Prior to the enactment of FECA, the CCCs typically operated
as money conduits, funneling large donations from particular contribu-
tors to specified candidates.124 To be sure, contemporary party commit-
tees appear to be much more active and sophisticated in soliciting funds
and determining how those funds will be spent. For the most part, par-
ties do not literally hand over money received from particular donors to
specified candidates.' 25 Party committees can and do make their own
independent strategic judgments concerning which races most require
the deployment of campaign money. But the rise of soft money, the
enormous disparity between FECA's limits on individual and PAC dona-
tions to candidates and the much larger sums given in soft money, and
the role of federal officeholders in soliciting soft money contributions to
the parties suggest that donor-to-party-to-candidate conduit corruption is
a real possibility.
Small donors may have little influence over how the parties use their
donations, but a substantial portion of hard money donations to the par-
ties consists of very large gifts. In 1996, 86% of the hard money in excess
of $200 given by individuals to the national Democratic party consisted of
gifts of $1000 or more; 46% came in donations of $10,000 or more.
Large gifts were a substantial, albeit slightly smaller share of donations to
the national Republican party: Donations of $1000 or more amounted to
52% of hard money individual donations of $200 or more, while dona-
tions of $10,000 or more amounted to 15% of hard money individual
donations. 126
Soft money provides donors with even greater opportunities to reach
candidates through the parties. In 1997-98, there were almost 25,000
donors who gave $200 or more to the national parties' soft money ac-
counts. 127 Their contributions came to $176 million, or about 80% of
total party soft money. Of these, just 700 donors (or 3% of those giving
$200 or more) provided 40% of the aggregate amount provided by the
$200+ donors, averaging about $97,000 each. As previously noted, the
top 390 donors each contributed $100,000 or more-and many contrib-
uted far more than that. These amounts are well above FECA's $1000 per
election limit on individual donations to candidates and the Act's $5000
per election limit on PAC donations to candidates. When all donations
124. See Brooks Jackson, Honest Graft: Big Money and the American Political
Process 56 (1988); Kolodny, supra note 25, at 79, 86, 90, 94, 97; see also Shea, supra note
110, at 25.
125. Such a direct pass-along of donations is illegal under FECA, which provides that
contributions by an individual or a PAC which "are in any way earmarked or otherwise
directed through an intermediary or conduit" to a candidate "shall be treated as
contributions from such person to such candidate." 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(8) (1994).
126. See Biersack & Haskell, supra note 51, at 160.
127. See Public Disclosure, Inc., supra note 43. FECA requires parties to itemize by
name of donor and size only those donations at or above $200. Consequently, there is far
more information about these donations than about donations under $200.
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from a particular sector or industry are aggregated, the sums in questions
can be enormous.1 28 Surely, such large donors can be expected to have
some say over how their contributions are spent, and can influence party
giving and spending decisions.1 29
Moreover, party fund-raising practices establish close links between
officeholders and potential donors to the parties. Federal officials are
directly involved in soliciting contributions for the party committees' soft
money accounts. 130 President Clinton and Vice President Gore were
prominently involved in raising money for the Democratic party's soft
money operations, and Bob Dole raised Republican soft money in con-
nection with his 1996 presidential bid. Democrats offered their $50,000+
donors intimate dinners with the President, small-group coffees in the
White House Map Room, and overnight stays in the Lincoln Bedroom.131
Republicans provided members of their Team 100-those who gave
$100,000 or more-with a three-day opportunity to golf with Senate Ma-
jority Leader Lott, Speaker Gingrich, and then-House Appropriations
Committee Chair (and briefly Speaker-designate) Livingston at The
Breakers at Palm Beach.' 3 2 In 1995-96, "[d]inners, weekend outings,
and other events were regularly used by both major parties to give major
donors a sense that they are close to power. 133 The DNC raised $27
million from the 350 people invited to attend the notorious White House
coffees with President Clinton; of this amount $3.1 million came from
donors who made their contributions within a week of attending the cof-
fee.13 4 In the current Congress, as the Wall Street Journal recently re-
ported, "cash-for-access confabs on pending bills are business as usual in
Washington."135
Certainly, parties are aware of which candidates, which dinners or
other events, or which fundraising appeals highlighting particular candi-
dates, drew contributions from which donors. Funds raised for the Dem-
ocratic Party by Hillary Rodham Clinton, for example, are likely to be
128. See Jeffrey Taylor, GOP to Get "Soft Money" Tobacco Aid, Wall St. J., Jan. 7,
2000, at A16 (reporting that tobacco company executives say industry will donate "at least
$7 million" toward the 2000 elections "mostly in unregulated 'soft money' contributions to
Republican Party committees").
129. Cf. Joe & Wilcox, supra note 83, at 62 ("When individuals give $1,000 to a
presidential candidate they cannot expect much in return, but a contribution of $500,000
or an industrywide contribution of $4 million is perhaps a different matter.").
130. Prohibited and Excessive Contributions; "Soft Money," 63 Fed. Reg. 37,722,
37,728 (1998) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. §§ 102, 103, 106) (proposed July 13, 1998).
131. See Alison Mitchell, Building a Bulging War Chest: How Clinton Financed His
Run, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1996, at Al.
132. See Katharine Q. Seelye, G.O.P. Reward for Its Biggest Donors: 3 Days of
Rubbing Elbows With Party Leaders, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1997, at B9.
133. Biersack & Haskell, supra note 51, at 173.
134. See Daniel M. Yarmish, The Constitutional Basis for a Ban on Soft Money, 67
Fordham L. Rev. 1257, 1281 n.217 (1998).
135. Phil Kuntz, Cash-for-Access Policy Forums on Bills Are Common, Controversial
in Senate, Wall St. J., Jan. 25, 2000, at A16.
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spent by the party in coordination with, or issue advocacy for, her New
York Senate race even if the money is not specifically earmarked for her
campaign. 136
Finally, fundraising for party committees does not simply provide do-
nors with special access to specific federal candidates, but directly con-
nects large donors with the federal government itself. Political scientists
conventionally distinguish among the "party-in-electorate," the "party-as-
organization," and the "party-in-government." 1 7 Under this division, the
"party-as-organization" provides money, staff and other resources for
party candidates. The "party-in-government," meanwhile, organizes the
executive branch and Congress, provides legislative leadership, deter-
mines the composition and control of committees, and ultimately, shapes
the legislative agenda, the policymaking process and the decisions and
votes of those who hold elective office. Under the current campaign fi-
nance system, however, the "party-as-organization" and the "party-in-gov-
ernment" are increasingly merged. Members of Congress constitute and
control the CCCs that play the leading role in providing party money and
campaign services to congressional candidates. The President typically
controls his party's national committee, and once a favorite has emerged
for the presidential nomination of the other party, that candidate and his
party's national committee typically work closely together. As a result,
large donations to the party organization are effectively donations not
just to specific candidates but to the party-in-government's leadership,
who use that money to protect or expand their power in government, by
spending in congressional races and the presidential election.
The danger, then, is not simply that party committees will channel
private money to particular candidates, but that party leaders are provid-
ing large party donors with direct access to the leaders of the govern-
ment-who happen to be the party leaders themselves. Party committees
do not so much dilute and "cleanse" private interest money as centralize
it and focus it on the President and the congressional leadership. This
process can make it easier for large private interests to influence the legis-
lative process. Instead of donors having to reach out to multiple individ-
ual members of Congress, contributions to party campaign committees
place donors in direct contact with the legislators who dominate the legis-
lative process. 138 There is now the potential for large donors to "corrupt"
136. See, e.g., Susan B. Glasser, Clinton Taps Big Donors For Special N.Y. Account,
Wash. Post, Jan. 4, 2000, at Al (reporting that although donors to the Democratic Party did
not receive commitments that funds raised by Hillary Rodham Clinton would be used in
her New York Senate race, "at least some of the contributors clearly believe their checks
effectively amount to a quid pro quo. They give money to the DSCC [Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Committee], which puts it back into the New York race.").
137. See, e.g., Aldrich, supra note 109, at 10.
138. See, e.g., Sorauf, supra note 109, at 31 (noting that party committees offer
donors "longer-run personal relationships with important, even leading policymakers.
Above all, they offer access to a whole cohort of party candidates and incumbents rather
than access merely to a single candidate or incumbent.").
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not just individual candidates but the parties,/and, thus, to "corrupt" the
government itself since the party leaders for election fundraising pur-
poses are increasingly the same as the leaders of the parties in
government.
Given the web of relations linking major donors, party committees,
and elected officials, large donations to the parties and spending by the
parties in support of their candidates clearly implicates Buckley's con-
cern, recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Nixon v. Shrink Mis-
souri Government PAC, with "'improper influence' and 'opportunities for
abuse' in addition to 'quid pro quo arrangements,"' resulting from "poli-
ticians too compliant with the wishes of large contributors." 139 The evi-
dence from the states, the very large size of soft money contributions, and
the role of the President and leading members of Congress in fundrais-
ing for large donations to the parties all indicate that conduit corruption
is a sufficiently great danger in practice as well as in theory to support
limits on both donations to the parties and on party direct support for
candidates.140
III. REFORMING THE PARTY MONEY RULES
As outlined above, the parties are eroding the basic elements of our
campaign finance system. Due to the combination of party issue advo-
cacy and independent spending, limits on party spending in support of
candidates are effectively nonexistent. This development undermines
the spending limits that are a central feature of publicly funded presiden-
tial elections, and that would probably be a part of any system for the
public funding of congressional elections. The parties' circumvention of
FECA's limits on their spending in congressional elections also enables
large donors to effectively avoid FECA's contribution limits. The rise of
soft money, and its growing use in paying for party issue advocacy, has
substantially undermined the restrictions on the ability of wealthy donors,
corporations, and unions to participate financially in federal elections.
Campaign finance reform cannot survive unless the loopholes developed
or exploited by the parties are plugged.
This can be done, consistent with the Buckley doctrine, provided the
differences between parties and other political organizations are taken
into account in interpreting Buckley. The structural and functional differ-
ences between parties and PACs should lead to a broader definition of
coordination and express advocacy in cases where party spending con-
139. 120 S. Ct. 897, 905 (2000) (citing and quoting Buckley).
140. See id. at 906 ("The quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened
judicial scrutiny of legislative judgments will vary up or down with the novelty and
plausibility of the justification raised. Buckley demonstrates that the dangers of large,
corrupt contributions and the suspicion that large contributions are corrupt are neither
novel nor implausible."). For extensive judicial fact-finding concerning the role of party
committees in linking donors to candidates and elected officials as part of the quest for
soft money, see Mariani v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 2d 352, 391-407 (M.D. Pa 1999).
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cerning party candidates is at stake. So, too, the nexus of large donors,
party committees, and the parties-in-government adequately justifies lim-
its on all donations to the parties, and on party support for candidates.
Reforming the party money rules, however, should not consist solely
of new restrictions on the parties. Party money also plays a positive role
in the campaign finance system. 141 As a result, once FECA is amended to
subject all party money involved in federal election campaigns to regula-
tion, then some of the hard money limits, particularly those dealing with
party spending, could be raised.
A. Independent Spending
As I suggested in Part II, Colorado Republican's protection for party
independent spending reflects a view that parties are little different from
PACs and ignores the ongoing structural relationships and shared electo-
ral goals of candidates and their parties. Assuming that Colorado Republi-
can, and particularly its conclusions that parties are capable of independ-
ent spending and that such spending is constitutionally protected from
limitation, remains good law, the key goal of campaign finance reform
ought to be the redefinition of "independence" in the party context.
Currently, the distinction between independent spending and
spending coordinated with a candidate turns on the relationship between
the candidate and the spender with respect to specific communications.
Spending is deemed coordinated only where the candidate or her agents
control, or engage in "substantial discussion or negotiation between the
campaign and the spender over, a communication's (1) contents; (2)
timing; (3) location, mode, or intended audience . . .or (4) 'volume'
(e.g., number of copies of printed materials or frequency of media
spots) ."142
Such a standard may make sense with respect to spending by PACs
and individuals. PACs and political activists are structurally distinct from
the candidates they back, and they have goals other than the election of
candidates. Because PACs and candidates lack ongoing organizational
relationships, effective coordination may require close interactions con-
cerning particular communications. Moreover, PAC speech-even when
expressly calling for the election of a candidate-may reflect an alterna-
tive or additional goal of putting a particular issue before the electorate
and making that issue central to the campaign. As a result, it protects the
PAC's interests in speaking independently to require collaboration con-
cerning a particular message as a precondition to a finding of coordina-
tion. To be sure, PACs and other organizations long ago learned how to
assure that their spending benefits the candidates they intend to benefit
without formal cooperation, but it is still appropriate to require the defi-
141. See infra text accompanying notes 165-169.
142. FEC v. Christian Coalition, 52 F. Supp. 2d 45, 92 (D.D.C. 1999).
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nition of independent spending to take into account the independent
interests of non-party organizations. 1 43
Parties, however, are in quite a different relationship to their candi-
dates. There are so many ongoing and longstanding ties between candi-
dates and parties that coordination may be easily accomplished without
formal contacts concerning a particular ad. As the FEC has noted,
party committees are in regular contact with their candidates,
help develop candidate messages and campaign strategy, and
routinely share overlapping consultants, pollsters, fundraisers,
and other campaign agents .... [T]hese consultations, discus-
sions, and arrangements involve face-to-face meetings, tele-
phone conversations, and exchanges of paper and electronic
mail on a regular basis, sometimes daily, and take place at both
the staff level and higher levels. 144
More important, once a party has embraced a candidate, their elec-
toral goals are the same-the election of that candidate. Parties do not
seek to interject new issues into the campaign; they seek to help their
candidates win so that the party can hold or retain power in government.
Consequently, the central issue in determining whether party spending is
independent or coordinated should be not whether the particular com-
munication is independent or coordinated, but whether the party has
firmly allied itself with the candidate it is supporting.
I would argue that a party has so committed itself to a candidate
once it has (i) nominated or (ii) made a direct contribution to, or a coor-
dinated expenditure with, that candidate. 145 This approach accepts the
constitutional point of the Colorado Republican plurality that a party organ-
ization may engage in election-related spending before it commits itself
to a particular candidate, and that such spending should enjoy the pro-
tections available to independent expenditures. But this proposal-
which would be implemented by an amendment to FECA spelling out the
definition of coordinated party expenditure-recognizes the real-world
fact that once a party has tied itself to a candidate, the party and the
143. I do not intend to validate the current distinction between independent and
coordinated expenditures in the nonparty context. I simply accept it with the goal of
showing that the differences between political parties and other organizations justify a
narrower definition of "independence" in the party context.
144. Independent Expenditures and Party Committee Expenditure Limitations, 62
Fed. Reg. 24,367, 24,369-70 (1997).
145. As this Article was going to press, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held that FECA's limits on party coordinated expenditures are
unconstitutional. See Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC ("Colorado
Respublican II"), No. 99-1211, 2000 WL 554688 (10th Cir. May 5, 2000). Needless to say, if
Colorado Republican II stands, my recommendations for a narrower redefinition of party
independent expenditures would be rendered irrelevant. For a brief discussion of Colorado
Republican II, see infra notes 174-190 and accompanying text.
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candidate are organizationally intertwined and share the exact same elec-
toral agenda: the election of the candidate.
146
B. Party Issue Advocacy
Party issue advocacy poses an even greater threat to campaign fi-
nance laws than does party independent spending. Not only is issue ad-
vocacy exempt from spending limits, but issue ads may be paid for with
soft money, thus allowing wealthy individuals, corporations, and unions
to participate directly in financing campaign ads.1 47 Consequently, the
most pressing issue for campaign finance reform is the control of party
issue advocacy.
My approach to party issue advocacy is essentially the same as my
approach to party independent spending. The Constitution permits the
regulation of election-related speech, but not of other political speech.148
As a result, we need to draw a line between election campaign spending
and other political spending. That line must be sharp and objective, and
it must accurately distinguish between election-related and non-election-
related speech. Parties as well as PACs and individuals are capable of
engaging in non-election-related speech, and when they do so they
should receive the full protection of the Constitution. But the determina-
tion of which communications are election-related, or express advocacy,
and which are non-election-related, or issue advocacy, is necessarily af-
fected by the identity of the speaker.
As I noted in Part II, non-party organizations and individuals have
significant goals other than winning elections. For them, winning elec-
tions is likely to be a means to the end of advancing certain policy goals,
rather than an end in itself. When they engage in speech that mingles
references to elected officials or candidates and issues, it is quite possible
that their aim is to influence official decisionmaking or even the discus-
146. The proposal is at odds with the Minnesota district court decision in Republican
Party of Minnesota v. Pauly, which invalidated a Minnesota law that provided that party
spending in support of a nominee is presumptively coordinated with the candidate. 63 F.
Supp. 2d 1008, 1012-19 (D. Minn. 1999). I believe that Pauly is mistaken and should not
be followed.
The Shays-Meehan bill passed by the House of Representatives in 1998 and 1999
includes a more limited proposal, providing that once a party has nominated a candidate it
can undertake either independent or coordinated spending for that candidate, but not
both. See H.R. 417, 106th Cong., § 205 (1999); H.R. 3526, 105th Cong. § 204 (1998).
That proposal would allow a party to engage in unlimited spending on behalf of a
nominee, as well as to engage in both coordinated and independent spending for the
candidate prior to formal nomination. This solution does not adequately address the
potential for party independent spending to subvert the limits on party support for
candidates.
147. Issue ads are also exempt from FECA's reporting and disclosure requirements.
That may be less important for the national political party committees which are
independently subject to reporting and disclosure requirements, but it does allow issue
spending by non-party groups to avoid disclosure.
148. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976).
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sion of issues in the electoral context, rather than the election itself. To
be sure, even speech by non-party organizations that combines discus-
sions of issues with references to candidates is likely to be election-related
when broadcast or published in the days and weeks immediately before
election day. 1 4 9 Still, the definition of express advocacy must acknowl-
edge that non-party speakers have important political interests other than
the election of candidates.
Parties are quite different. Winning elections, and thereby political
power, is their preeminent concern. When party communications com-
bine references to issues with references to a candidate, they are using
the issues to advance the candidate and win the election; they are not
using the candidate to advance the issues.
Not all party speech is necessarily election-related. Party activists, in-
cluding elected officials, are interested in issues, and it is possible for
party committees to spend money whose sole purpose and likely effect is
to influence public thinking about issues. And party speech that is truly
about issues is entitled to the same constitutional protection as the issue
speech of other organizations. The question, then, in light of the distinc-
tive focus of the major political parties on elections and the evidence
presented in Part II of how parties have come to use speech currently
defined as issue advocacy to advance their electoral agendas, is where to
draw the elections/politics line when party spending is at stake.
I propose that all communications by the committees of the major
political parties that clearly identify by name or likeness a candidate for
federal office ought to be treated as express advocacy. This approach is
consistent with the First Amendment goal of avoiding vague regulation:
The "clearly identified candidate" test provides a bright, objective line for
distinguishing one set of communications from another. If parties want
to disseminate messages concerning issues, they may do so as long as
those messages avoid referring to clearly identified candidates. But the
test also reflects the evidence that party communications that mention
candidates-even those that eschew the "magic words" of express advo-
cacy-are really part of the party's campaign to promote the election or
defeat of the candidates mentioned. In this way, the test protects true
party issue advocacy, but defines such issue advocacy in terms appropriate
to the distinctive institutional function of political party committees, to
the predominance of electoral over issue goals in spending by the major
parties, and to the evidence of the parties' exploitation of advertising that
is clearly election-related, but falls outside the current definition of ex-
press advocacy.
In effect, this approach links party speech to candidate speech. I
previously explained that when a candidate spends money to broadcast a
campaign message, that is automatically considered to be election-related
speech even when the candidate refrains from using the "magic words" of
149. See Briffault, supra note 47, at 1782-87.
[Vol. 100:620
2000] POLITICAL PARTIES AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM 657
express advocacy. 150 Parties are not quite candidates, and they may have
goals other than the election of a candidate. But when a party communi-
cation clearly refers to a federal candidate, it may be safely assumed that
the party is working to elect or defeat that candidate. Once it has clearly
invoked the name or likeness of a candidate, the party has crossed the
line from the general discussion of issues to participation in an election
campaign. Like a candidate's campaign speech, a party's campaign
speech ought to be hard-money funded regardless of whether the speech
deploys the magic words of express advocacy.1 51
This recommendation goes much further than the other principal
proposals for regulating issue ads, 152 but its tight focus on party adsjusti-
fies its broader definition of express advocacy. Party issue ads are particu-
larly dangerous to the campaign finance system because, as the activities
of the 1996 presidential election demonstrate, these ads link up unlim-
ited corporate, union, and individual soft money donations with fundrais-
ing by elected officials and candidates, and they directly undermine the
limits on spending by publicly funded candidates. By the same token,
because leading federal officials are centrally involved in the fundraising
that pays for issue advocacy, and because issue advocacy has become such
an integral part of candidates' campaigns, it is much easier, from an anti-
corruption perspective, to justify stringent regulation of party issue ads
than of comparable ads of non-party organizations or individuals.
C. Soft Money
The constitutional case for eliminating soft money contributions is
relatively straightforward. As a form of contribution, soft money can be
regulated if it presents a danger of corruption or the appearance of cor-
150. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79.
151. Consistent with the distinction between coordinated and independent spending,
party spending that refers to a candidate would still be independent, and exempt from
FECA's spending limits, if the party had not nominated the candidate (or, where the
speech is critical of the candidate, had not nominated her opponent) or contributed to the
candidate (or her opponent).
152. The Shays-Meehan bill, which has twice passed the House of Representatives,
would widen the definition of express advocacy to include communications that (i) express
"unmistakable and unambiguous support for or opposition to one or more clearly
identified candidates when taken as a whole and with limited reference to external events,
such as proximity to an election" or (ii) refer to a clearly identified candidate and are aired
on television or radio within sixty days of an election in a state in which the candidate is
running. H.R. 417 § 201; H.R. 3526 § 201. The FEC, by regulation, has adopted the
"unmistakable and unambiguous support" test, 11 C.F.R. § 100.22(b) (1) (1999), but that
regulation has been invalidated in the courts. See Right to Life of Dutchess County, Inc. v.
FEC, 6 F. Supp. 2d 248, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Maine Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. FEC, 914
F. Supp. 8, 13 (D. Me. 1996), aff'd 98 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1996); see also Kansans For Life v.
Gaede, 38 F. Supp. 2d 928, 936-38 (D. Kan. 1999) (enjoining Kansas Governmental Ethics
Commission from enforcing a definition of express advocacy that is broader than an
explicit call for a vote for or against a candidate); Briffault, supra note 47, at 1780-87
(reviewing proposal for regulating issue advocacy).
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ruption. Given the size of soft money donations by individuals, corpora-
tions, unions, and other organizations, and the direct involvement of fed-
eral officials in raising these funds, the corruption danger posed by soft
money is manifest.1 53 The current, administratively created exemption
for soft money is based on the theory that soft money is used for non-
federal purposes, but over the last two decades a central function of soft
money has been to influence federal elections. In 1996, roughly one-
quarter of all national party soft money expenditures were undertaken by
the four party congressional campaign committees. 154 These are organi-
zations composed of members of Congress whose sole raison d'etre is
electing federal candidates. How is it possible for any of that money to be
considered non-federal in any meaningful sense? The remainder of the
national party soft money spending was undertaken by the Democratic
and Republican National Committees which, in presidential election
years, are heavily focused on winning that election.155 Soft money spend-
ing by state parties, in turn, is also usually controlled by the national com-
mittees which are the sources of state party soft money funds. 156
To be sure, some soft money funds activities, such as voter registra-
tion and partisan voter mobilization drives, that benefit both federal and
non-federal candidates. But even then the non-federal component also
benefits federal candidates, since it frees up hard money that would
otherwise have been used to fund those activities and allows the parties to
spend more on direct contributions to candidates or on coordinated ex-
penditures involving express advocacy.
Professor Bradley Smith has argued that since party issue advocacy
expenditures are constitutionally protected from limitation, it would be
unconstitutional to limit soft money contributions to the parties that are
used to fund party issue advocacy. 157 I have just argued that in the party
context express advocacy may be more expansively defined so as to cover
most of what is now currently considered to be issue advocacy. If so, such
advocacy would have to be hard-money funded.
Even if I am mistaken, and party spending that currently falls under
the rubric of issue advocacy is constitutionally immune from limitation,
soft money restrictions, including restrictions on soft money that would
be used to fund issue advocacy, ought nevertheless to be constitutional.
Although Buckley held that expenditures by candidates present no danger
of corruption, and thus may not be limited, it also found that the contri-
butions that finance those expenditures may be regulated when they
present dangers of quid pro quos that undermine the integrity of the
153. See Mariani v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 2d 352, 407-18 (M.D. Pa. 1999).
154. See Biersack & Haskell, supra note 51, at 172.
155. See Crotty, supr4 note 73, at 212 (noting that in 1996 the DNC "worked
interchangeably with the White House as an extension of the presidential campaign").
156. See, e.g., Mariani, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 384-85; Bibby, supra note 109, at 43-44.
157. See supra note 66, and accompanying text.
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political process. 15 8 So, too, even if so-called issue advocacy expenditures
undertaken by the parties are immune from restriction, limits on contri-
butions to parties to fund issue advocacy are constitutional if they are
necessary to prevent corruption of the political process. Given the dan-
gers of undue influence implicit in the process by which the soft money
used to fund party issue advocacy is raised, restrictions on soft money
should be constitutionally valid.
Thus, Congress should amend FECA to require that all money raised
by federal officials and candidates for their own campaigns or for their
parties, all money raised by national party committees, and all money
raised by state parties to be used in connection with federal election activ-
ity comply with FECA's hard money dollar limits. 159 This measure is nec-
essary to restore the integrity of the campaign finance laws, and is surely
constitutional. 160
158. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23-35 (1976).
159. This is the essence of the Shays-Meehan bill, H.R. 417, 106th Cong. § 101 (1999)
(amending § 323(a), (b), (c) of FECA). Shays-Meehan would allow state parties to
continue to use money that does not comply with FECA to pay for the nonfederal share of
their administrative and overhead expenses, as determined by the FEC, and it would
permit federal officeholders to raise nonfederal money when they are running for state
office. See id. § 323(b) (2) (B) (v), (e) (2). These exceptions seem both reasonable and
consistent with the basic thrust of assuring that money used in federal elections complies
with the restrictions of federal election law.
160. A serious and non-constitutional objection to limits on party soft money
fundraising, as well as to restrictions of party issue advocacy spending, is that any such
regulation is likely to drive more campaign money into the coffers of non-party
organizations. This could have two consequences. First, many of these independent
political committees are exempt from federal reporting and disclosure requirements, yet
benefit from Section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code, which makes donations to certain
political organizations exempt from gift tax, and makes contributions received by such
organizations exempt from income tax. See, e.g., John M. Broder & Raymond Bonner,
The 2000 Campaign: The Money Factor; A Political Voice, Without Strings, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 29, 2000, at Al (describing issue advocacy spending of tax-exempt "Section 527"
organizations); cf. Dennis Moore, 527 Organizations: A Right to Know and a
Responsibility to Act, Roll Call, February 24, 2000 (member of Congress calling for
application of FECA reporting and disclosure requirements to Section 527 organizations).
As a result, tightening up on party activities could have the perverse effect of decreasing
the amount of information available to the voters concerning the sources of campaign
money, and greatly increasing the campaign role of organizations which, unlike the major
political parties, are not accountable to the public.
Second, many of these independent organizations have loose affiliations with the
major parties. See, e.g., Full Disclosure, Roll Call, April 6, 2000 (discussing relationship
between House Majority Whip Tom Delay and a Section 527 entity called "U.S. Family
Network"); Todd S. Purdum, A New Player Enters the Campaign Spending Fray, N.Y.
Times, April 2, 2000, at A24 (discussing the role of "Shape the Debate," a nonprofit
political organization created by the owner of a Republican consulting firm and benefiting
from the fundraising of former California Republican Governor Pete Wilson); Broder &
Bonner, supra (discussing activities of Republicans for Clean Air, and noting the role of
Republican members of Congress in establishing Section 527 organizations). As a result,
many of the new limits on party activities might be evaded by the emergence of shadowy
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D. Raising the Hard Money Limits
The goal of bringing all party money under FECA is not anti-party,
but, rather, pro-campaign finance regulation. It does not assume that
party participation in campaign financing is a bad thing. Instead, it pro-
ceeds from the finding that party committees, because of their close con-
nections to both donors and candidates, occupy a uniquely strategic posi-
tion in the campaign finance system. Failure to limit the parties
threatens the collapse of the system. But once party money is effectively
regulated, there is much to be said for an expanded party campaign fi-
nance role. Indeed, with its higher limits on donations to the national
parties and its provisions for party coordinated expenditures and grass-
roots expenditures, FECA already accords the parties a relatively privi-
leged position.
Three factors support a prominent party role in funding campaigns.
First, compared to PACs and individual donors, parties are far more likely
to give to challengers. A central problem of our campaign finance system
is its failure to provide challengers with adequate funding. According to
a recent study of congressional elections by the Committee for Economic
Development, "[t]he majority of House challengers now raise and spend
so little that they cannot wage a viable campaign." Indeed, 60% of House
nonprofit political organizations that are nominally independent but de facto allied with
one of the major parties.
Taking the latter point first, evasion of restrictions on the parties is likely to be a
serious concern. Even under current law the parties are actively involved in working with
nominally independent groups in order to evade FECA's limitations on party activities.
See, e.g., John F. Bibby, Party Networks: National-State Integration, Allied Groups, and
Issue Activists in The State of the Parties: The Changing Role of Contemporary American
Parties, supra note 32, at 69, 75-81. The problem could worsen if FECA's regulation of the
parties is tightened. Effective enforcement of the proposed restrictions on the parties will
require both a greater commitment of FEC resources, as well as a legal determination of
when non-party committee activities are coordinated with the parties that takes into
account current campaign practices. Both FEC enforcement and the independent/
coordinated activities distinction are problems endemic to campaign finance law and
beyond the scope of this article. But I acknowledge that unless the FEC is able to
effectively police the relationship between party committees and allied nonparty
organizations, and unless the courts are willing to apply a realistic definition of
"coordination," then many of the proposed restrictions, like many of the current
restrictions, may prove ineffective.
The diversion of funds from the parties to independent organizations may be a less
serious concern. The reduction in voter information due to lack of a reporting and
disclosure requirements for nonprofit political organizations can be cured by appropriate
amendments to the Internal Revenue Code. See, e.g., Amy Keller, Rep. Doggett Taking
Aim at "527" Groups: Members Trying to Rein in "Super Weapon of Choice" in This
Election Cycle, Roll Call, April 10, 2000 (describing congressman's plan to eliminate
"stealth PACs" by requiring full disclosure of contributions and expenditures of Section
527 organizations). Moreover, when the fundraising role of elected officials and party
committees composed of elected officials is curtailed, whatever harm that might result
from non-party groups that are not accountable to the public playing a bigger role in
campaigns will be offset by the reduction of the dangers that large soft money donors will
gain undue influence over, and opportunities for special access to, government officials.
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incumbents "either had no significant opposition or outspent their oppo-
nents by a margin of 10-to-i or more." 16 1 In 1998, the average House
incumbent outspent the average House challenger by 2.4 to 1.162
PACs and large individual donors contribute to this fiscal edge of
incumbency. Most PACs and large individual donors make contributions
in order to obtain or secure access to elected officials "who are in a posi-
tion to influence regulations, appropriations, or treaties that effect [sic]
the environment in which the PAC's industry or workforce operates.
These groups consider campaign contributions an important tool for re-
affirming or strengthening their relationships with influential
lawmakers." 1 63 PACs and individuals that follow access strategies over-
whelmingly favor incumbents with their contributions.16 4
Parties, by contrast, are more likely to support promising challeng-
ers. 16 5 Party committees deliberately allocate their money strategically to
maximize their chances of winning control of Congress. This strategy will
frequently dictate sending money to a promising challenger rather than
reinforcing the overloaded warchest of an incumbent facing only weak
opposition. 16 6 Thus, far more than PAC money or donations by wealthy
individuals, party money promotes the value of electoral competition.
A second benefit of parties is that they devote a considerable portion
of their spending to grass-roots activity, such as voter registration and
voter mobilization. 1 67 Party spending, thus, can promote citizen partici-
pation and voter turnout. The party label is an important cue for voters,
providing general information about candidate orientations over a range
of policy issues. An enhanced party campaign presence could improve
voter understanding of the candidates and the quality of voter decisions.
Finally, as the scholars and justices who contend that parties dilute
special interest money have pointed out,1 6 8 the relatively broad-based na-
ture of parties has the potential to mitigate the politically balkanizing ef-
161. Research and Policy Comm., Committee for Economic Development, Investing
in the People's Business: A Business Proposal for Campaign Finance Reform 17 (1999).
162. See id. See also Herrnson, Financing the 1996 Congressional Elections, supra
note 53, at 118 (in 1996, average House incumbent outspent average House challenger by
2.7 to 1). The imbalance in Senate races was less dramatic, with incumbents outspending
challengers by about 1.5 to 1. See id. at 120; Committee for Economic Development, supra
note 161, at 18.
163. Herrnson, Financing the 1996 Congressional Elections, supra note 53, at 105.
164. See id. at 109-14 (stating that in 1996, 88% of contributions of corporate PACs
in House elections went to incumbents; 62% of large individual hard money donations
went to incumbents).
165. See id. at 102-04; Malbin & Gais, supra note 33, at 145-52.
166. Party committees will also give heavily to incumbents facing serious opposition.
167. See Smith, supra note 66, at 199-200; see also Stephen Ansolabehere &James M.
Snyder, Jr., Soft Money, Hard Money, Strong Parties, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 598, 617 (2000)
(contending that party spending increases turnout).
168. See text accompanying supra notes 118-120.
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fects of advocacy by special interest groups.' 69 Parties are less effective at
muting the voices of their special interest constituents when a handful of
very large donors play a preeminent role in financing party activities.
However, there is much to be said for the dilution argument if the size of
donations to the parties is capped.
In light of the role of the parties in promoting the democratic values
of electoral competition, political participation, and public-regarding
government decisionmaking, a comprehensive campaign finance reform
package should combine the elimination of soft money and unlimited
party spending with some increase in the permitted levels of party hard
money support for party candidates. By reforming the law so as to make
effective FECA's prohibitions on corporate, union, and large individual
contributions, Congress would ameliorate the conduit corruption dan-
gers posed by party support for candidates. It could then raise party
spending levels so as to increase the opportunities for parties to support
challengers, promote political participation, and reduce the dependence
of candidates on funds provided by narrowly-focused special interest
groups. This combination of reforms would make soft money and spend-
ing restrictions more politically palatable while resulting in a better cam-
paign finance system than could be achieved via soft money and spending
controls alone.
At present, parties provide only a modest portion-around 10% -of
the hard money funds spent by congressional candidates, a figure which
is far less than the shares provided by wealthy individuals or PACs. 170 The
case for increasing FECA's limits on party spending is reinforced by the
rapidly increasing costs of congressional elections. FECA's limits on party
direct contributions to candidates were set in 1974, and have not been
adjusted for inflation. The limits on coordinated contributions have
been adjusted for inflation, but from 1976 to 1996 congressional cam-
paign costs increased at more than triple the inflation rate.1 71 Indeed, it
is reasonable to conclude that one of the reasons for the rise of soft
money is that in the absence of public funding, it has become increas-
ingly difficult for congressional candidates to both raise the money they
now need and also comply with FECA's unindexed hard money contribu-
tion limits and inadequately indexed hard money coordinated spending
limits. 172
169. See, e.g., Darrell M. West & Burdett A. Loomis, The Sound of Money: How
Political Interests Get What They Want 211 (1998).
170. See Herrnson, Financing the 1996 Congressional Elections, supra note 53, at
119-20.
171. See Sorauf, supra note 109, at 52.
172. The importance of soft money in presidential elections is also directly traceable
to the inadequate levels of presidential public funding. The initial public funding
allotment was set too low, and the subsequent adjustments have been inadequate to keep
pace with rising campaign costs. See Richard Briffault, Public Funding and Democratic
Elections, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 563, 586 (1999).
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Consequently, it would be a sensible campaign finance policy to ac-
commodate the rise in the cost of campaigning over the past quarter-
century by increasing the limits on party hard-money support for candi-
dates to triple their current state and by then indexing them henceforth.
The coordinated expenditure limits, which have been rising with infla-
tion, could be doubled to take into account the difference between the
inflation rate and the more rapid increase in campaign costs. 173
CONCLUSION: CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM AND PARTY REFORM
As this Article was going to press, a divided panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in the Colorado Republi-
can remand case ("Colorado Republican IT), held FECA's dollar limitations
on party coordinated expenditures unconstitutional.174 Colorado Republi-
can II would enable the political parties to spend unlimited amounts of
money in coordination with their congressional candidates. If it stands,
the Tenth Circuit panel's decision will transform one of the specific issues
discussed in this article. Striking the limits on coordinated expenditures
will make independent expenditures of very limited significance, since
there would be no incentive to make independent expenditures once
there is no limit on coordinated expenditures. So, too, my proposal for
limiting the definition of independence and expanding the definition of
coordination the party context would be rendered irrelevant if coordi-
nated expenditures cannot be limited.' 75
The Tenth Circuit panel decision is consistent with the arguments
embraced by several Justices of the Supreme Court in Colorado Republican
/176 that party spending is not corrupting, but Colorado Republican II has
its own particular wrinkles which undermine the persuasive value of its
holding. First, a central theme of Colorado Republican II is that a party is
"like an advocacy group." The parties "exist for noneconomic reasons..
. 'to disseminate political ideas, not to amass capital."1 77 As a result, the
Tenth Circuit determined that the evidentiary burden of demonstrating
contributions-and a coordinated expenditure is a form of contribu-
173. Even if soft money is eliminated, limits on party spending outside the public
funding context would remain appropriate. FECA's hard money limits allow PACs and
individuals to make far larger contributions to party committees than to candidates, so that
unlimited party spending would still allow party donors to evade the limits on donations to
candidates.
174. FEC v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., No. 99-1211, 2000 WL
55468 (10th Cir. May 5, 2000).
175. The role of party issue advocacy might also be reduced since one value of issue
advocacy is to enable the parties to avoid the limits on coordinated spending. But the
importance of issue advocacy in enabling the parties to spend soft money in direct support
of candidates would remain and, thus, the need to deal with party issue advocacy would
remain as well.
176. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 510 U.S. 604 (1996)
177. Colorado Republican II, 2000 WL 55468, at *6 (quoting FEC v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S, 238, 259 (1986)).
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
tion-corrupt is much higher for a restriction on party money than for a
limit on individual or PAC donations. Leaving aside the fact that parties
are not simply advocacy groups but are also organizations of government
officials who secure and wields public power, 178 the Tenth Circuit erred
in assuming that the Supreme Court's standard for determining whether
a contribution corrupts turns on whether the donor gives for ideological
or economic reasons. 179
Colorado Republican II conflated the Supreme Court's determination
in FEC v Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. ("MCFL"), 180 that FECA's abso-
lute ban on corporate campaign spending cannot constitutionally be ap-
plied to ideological corporations with the idea that contributions given by
ideological organizations enjoy greater constitutional protection than
contributions given for economic purposes.' 8 ' But the Supreme Court
has never drawn such a distinction. FECA's dollar limits on individual
and PAC contributions apply equally to donations by advocacy organiza-
tions or ideologically-minded individuals as to organizations and individu-
als with economic agendas for giving. The Supreme Court has never sug-
gested that ideological contributions are constitutionally immune from
dollar limitation. There is thus no basis in the Supreme Court's cam-
paign finance jurisprudence for Colorado Republican ITs determination
that restrictions on party contributions are subject to more stringent scru-
tiny because parties are ideological organizations- even if it is assumed
that parties are primarily ideological organizations.18 2
Second, the Tenth Circuit dismissed outright the argument that
party spending may be limited to protect FECA's limits on individual or
PAC contributions to candidates: "We will not validate limits on the pro-
tected speech of a political party as a back-door means of stemming cor-
178. See supra text accompanying note 137 for a discussion of how contemporary
party campaign finance practices are eroding the traditional distinction drawn by political
scientists between the party-as-organization and the party-in-government.
179. See Colorado Republican II, 2000 WL 55468, at *6 ("The opportunity for
corruption or its appearance is greatest when the political spending is motivated by
economic gain.").
180. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
181. See Colorado Republican II, 2000 WL 55468, at *6 (citing and quoting FEC v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S, 238, 259 (1986)).
182. Even if MCFL's invalidation of a complete ban on campaign expenditures by an
ideological corporation also applied to dollar limitations on contributions by ideological
organizations to candidates, political parties are not ideological organizations within
MCFL's definition. One of the "three features" MCFL relied on in distinguishing
corporations constitutionally entitled to an exemption from a ban on corporation
expenditures from those that may constitutionally be subject to such a restriction is that
exempt organizations have a "policy not to accept contributions from" business
corporations and labor unions. "This prevents such corporations from serving as conduits
for the type of direct spending that creates a threat to the political marketplace." MCFL,
479 U.S. at 263-64. But as this Article has noted, the major political parties do accept
contributions-indeed, hundreds of millions of dollars worth-from business corporations
and labor unions.
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porate involvement in the legislative process.' 83 But, as I have pointed
oUt,1 8 4 the Supreme Court has held that the prevention of conduit cor-
ruption provides a constitutional justification for limiting campaign con-
tributions.' 85 The Tenth Circuit concluded that any danger of conduit
contributions from a donor through a candidate to a party is fully ad-
dressed by FECA's provision treating contributions given through an in-
termediary that are specifically earmarked for a candidate as contribu-
tions to that candidate, so that further limits are superfluous and
unconstitutional. 186 But the Supreme Court has held that in appropriate
circumstances contributions can be curtailed in order to limit the ability
of donors "who might otherwise contribute massive amounts of money to
a particular candidate through the use of unearmarked contributions to
political committees likely to contribute to that candidate, or huge contri-
butions to the candidate's political party."1 87 The Supreme Court has
indicated that where an organization is free to engage in independent
political advocacy, as parties may, then "Congress was not required to se-
lect the least restrictive means of protecting the integrity of its legislative
scheme." Instead, Congress could determine that additional contribu-
tion limits "are a useful supplement" to the rule treating clearly
earmarked contributions as direct contributions to the candidate.
188
Moreover, there was evidence in the Colorado Republican II record that the
parties do link contributions from particular donors to particular candi-
dates without formal earmarking.' 89
Finally, the Tenth Circuit panel gave great weight to the vital role
political parties play in our political system. 190 But, as the Supreme Court
recognized in Buckley, campaign contributions, which in the absence of
public funding are essential for the effective operation of our electoral
system, also present dangers of corruption. Where large private contribu-
tions are channeled through the parties to candidates and officeholders,
the considerations that generally justify restrictions on large contribu-
tions apply to the parties as well. Moreover, limits on party money will
not necessarily cripple the ability of the parties to perform their vital role.
The parties flourished financially in the 1970s and 1980s when they were
183. See Colorado Republican II, 2000 WL 55468, at *8.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 114-117.
185. California Med. Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 199 (plurality opinion), 202-04
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (1981); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 (1976).
186. See Colorado Republican II, 2000 WL 55468, at *10 (citing and quoting 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(a)(8) (1994) and 11 C.F.R. § 110.6(b)(1) (1999).
187. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 38 (emphasis added).
188. California Med. Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 199-200 n.20.
189. See Colorado Republican II, 2000 WL 55468, at *21 (Seymour, C.J., dissenting)
(citing affidavits and depositions in trial record "that although earmarking ... is illegal,
prohibition is circumvented through 'understandings' regarding what donors give what
amounts to the party, which candidates are to receive what funds from the party, and what
interests particular donors are seeking to promote"). See also supra note 136.
190. See id. at *6-*7.
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subject to coordinated expenditure limits, and when independent ex-
penditures, soft money, and party issue advocacy were minor or nonexis-
tent factors in campaign finance.
Limits on party coordinated expenditures, like limits on party cam-
paign finance practices generally, are not anti-party. It is essential for the
integrity of the campaign finance laws to bring the parties back under
FECA. To do so should not be seen as anti-party. Indeed, some restric-
tions on party campaign finance activity may actually serve the best inter-
est of the parties. The current system, dominated by soft money and soft
money-financed issue advocacy, empowers large donors and centralizes
party finances and power within the parties in Washington. When party
leaders can raise huge sums at White House coffees or Speakers' Club
retreats, they necessarily become more sensitive to the interests of their
big donors, and less attentive to their less well-heeled, rank-and-file sup-
porters. When state party organizations rely on soft money transfers from
the national parties, they, too, may become less attentive to their grass-
roots members and less focused on activities that build the party from the
bottom up. The soft money system subtly transforms the parties from
community-based clubs to Capitol Hill organizations. Controlling large
donations to the parties could make the parties more participatory, and
more accountable to their local activists and voters.
The goal of campaign finance reform is not to limit the parties, but
to liberate the parties from corrupting influences. Once it is established
that party campaign finance practices are fully subject to FECA's limits
and requirements, and the danger of large donors using the parties to
subvert the campaign finance laws is ameliorated, the current limits on
the parties could be relaxed so as to bolster the positive role that parties
play in the political process. Regulation of party campaign finance activ-
ity is, thus, not an infringement on party rights or an interference with
party interests, but a means of making the parties more faithful to their
capacity to promote electoral competition, grass-roots political activity,
and broad-based approaches to the problems of governance.
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